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What follows is a study of Soviet attitudes towards Nordic and 
Scandinavian
' 
military and political cooperation from the early 
19208. to the mid-19SOs. One would not expect the Soviet 
leadership to be supponive of the idea of Nordic political and 
military cooperation. Until Gorbachev launched his new 
thtnldng in foreign affalrs 10 the late 19808, Soviet diplomacy 
tended to oppose the fOImation of political, econontic or 
military regional groups among European states in the Soviet 
Union's immediate vicinity.' Some examples, although random 
and far from exhaustive, will illustrate the point In the 
interwar period Polish foreign minister J6zef Beck's ideas 
about a system of cooperating states from the Baltic to the 
Black Sea alanned the Soviets, who saw in the Polish efforts 
an attempt create an additional anti-Soviet alliance system in 
the eastern part of Europe. The Soviets believed that the 
Polish plans of creating a "region of security" between Ger-
many and the Soviet Union' was part of the western policy of 
establishing a cordon sanitaire on the Soviet Union's western 
borders. During the war, Moscow's veto contributed to the 
failure of the Polish-Czechoslovak plan for a confederation in 
Central Europe.' After the war, the Soviets withdrew their 
support for Tito's and Dimitrov's plans for a Balkan Yugo-
slav-Bulgarian confederation as soon as the enterprise began 
to get out of Soviet control and some of the other East 
European countries showed interest in the idea.' In the 
follOwing years, until the final breakdown of Soviet hegemony 
in Eastern Europe, it was an important element of Soviet 
policy in the area to supervise and control the development of 
direct political and economic ties between the East European 
countries.' 
On the face of it, Soviet policy towards the Northern countries 
confirmed this general picture. In the 1920s and the first half 
of the 1930s the Soviet press and diplomats repeatedly 
attacked the idea of Scandinavian or Nordic military and 
political cooperation. Then, following the Soviet-Finnish 
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ceasefire in March 1940, Ihe Soviets vetoed plans for a 
Swedish-Flnnish-Norwegian defence union which had been 
brought up ~y the rIMS in Ihe final stage of the negotiations 
leading to the end of the fighting. After Ihe Second World 
War, as will be· discussed Iater in this study, Ihe Soviets 
opposed Ihe formation of a Scandlnavian defence union, 
notwithstanding the fact that DemnllIk's and Norway's choice, 
formally at least, was between Scandinavian or Atlantic 
alliance commitments: TIle experience of Soviet rejection of 
regional cooperation in general, repeated Soviet criticism of 
all forms of Nordic and SCandlnavian cooperation in Ihe 19205 
and first part of the 19305, and finally the outspoken Soviet 
opposition to the idea during and after the Second World War, 
led most Nordic politicians and observers to the following 
conclusions: 
In the inter war period and until the second half of the 1950s 
the Soviet Union was consistently opposed to schemes of 
Nordic or Scandlnavian military cooperation. Soviet opposition 
was even extended to non-military cooperation: political, 
economic and cultural. Moscow's basic assumption was that 
a Scandinavlan or Nordic regional group would extend the 
illfluence of the Western great powers right up to the very 
borders of the Soviet Union. 
On the European and global scale Soviet attitudes towards 
schemes of regional cooperation were not, however, consis-
tently negative. At times the Soviet government approved, or 
even encouraged, regional cooperation between states close to 
the Soviet Union itself. From KIaus T6rnudd's detailed study 
of the topiC it appears that (from the perspective of the early 
1960s) Soviet positive interest in regional cooperation had "at 
least two peaks - the middle of the 1930s and the middle or 
second half of the 1950s". In the mid-1930s the Soviet Union 
was interested in regional cooperation in Europe under the 
auspices of the League of Nations. At the latter time, the 
Soviet Union played a more active part, participating and even 
initiating new forms of regional cooperation.' 
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I will argue that also with regard to Northern regional 
military and political cooperation Soviet attitudes were more 
complex and fluid than is often taken for granted in the 
limited western literature on the topic. The Soviet attitude at 
any given moment depended on both the broader framework 
of Soviet European and global policies, and on Soviet 
perceptions of Nordic policies. However, as a result of 
ambiguities in the Soviet position and the nature of Soviet 
signaUing, public opinion and policy makers in the Northern 
countries were often unaware of the changes in the Soviet 
attitude. 
Soviet attitudes towards Nordic or Scandinavian cooperation 
demonstrated some of the contradictions and basic ambiguities 
which characterized Soviet foreign policy to its fmal ending. 
Much has been written about the two basic trends in Soviet 
foreign relations. The first, the revolutionary trend, was until 
1943 represented by the Communist International, the Comin-
tern, and thereafter by CPSU organs specifically designed to 
continue the tasks of the Comintern.' The other, what could be 
called a pragmatic or realpolitik tradition, had a stronger 
foothold in the other main foreign policy institution of the 
Soviet state, the Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, Narlc.om-
indel, in March 1946 renamed the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs.'· This was not, however, just an institutional conflict. 
It was an ambivalence inherent in the foreign policy makers 
themselves, and pan of the foreign policy making process on 
all levels. It was a struggle between two sets of world views, 
on the one hand the idiosyncratic bolshevik interpretation of 
the world, with its penchant for gross generalizations, holistic 
approaches, and conspiratorial theories; and on the other hand 
mainstream traditional western diplomatic thinking, with its 
emphasis on balance-of-power and military-strategic reasoning. 
Georgii Chicherin, the Soviet state's first real foreign minister, 
a learned man trained in the an of traditional Russian diplo-
macy," was the embodiment of the conflicting tendencies 
which made up the foreign policy of the Soviet state in its 
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early years. In such an environment it is hardly surprising that 
Soviet foreign policy, as it emerged from the various policy-
making bodies and centra in Moscow, could be ambiguous and 
even pursue conflicting gnals.12 
I will argue that the changing Soviet attitudes towards Nordic 
political and military cooperation, being not only a reflection 
of fluctuations in the external conditions, mirrored these 
c07!flicting tendencies or schools of thought within the Soviet 
foreign policy establishment. There were divisions on the issue 
among the Soviet foreign policy decisionmakers and between 
foreign policy institutions. As a result, Soviet policy became 
ambiguous or even contradictory. In the following, the 
predominant and basically negative attitude to Nordic coope-
ration will be linked to the "bolshevik idiosyncratic" inter-
pretation of international politics, and I will argue that the 
alternative positive approach mirrored the "realpolitik" 
tradition in Soviet foreign policy. 
The analysis is primarily focused on Soviet attitudes towards 
the idea of a Nordic or Scandinavian military "bloc", i.e. some 
sort of defensive alliance between one combination or another 
of the four Nordic or the three Scandinavian countries. 
However, the Soviets themselves, with their penchant for 
thinking in terms of sinister "behind-the-scene" forces and with 
their holistic understanding of politics, stubbornly viewed all 
aspects of Nordic foreign policies, not least the idea of Nordic 
cooperation, from the point of view of their real or imagined 
military-strategic ramifications. To some degree this holds true 
for both traditions alluded to above, although the conspiratorial 
interpretation of world politics to a particularly high degree 
was part of the bolshevik world view. Thus Soviet attitudes to 
other forms of Nordic cooperation were intertwined with 
Soviet policy with regard to military cooperation, because the 
Soviets were convinced that non-military forms of cooperation 
sooner or later would acquire military implications. Soviet 
attitudes towards non-military forms of cooperation reflected 
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their evaluation of the military side of the matter, and will be 
included in the analysis. 
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Soviet attitudes in western and Soviet 
hfstoriography 
Western research into the history of Scandinavian and Nordic 
foreign policies of the interwar period has paid no or little 
attention to Soviet attitudes to the idea of Nordic cooperation 
in foreign, security and military affairs." Although results of 
the discussions were meagre in the military field at least, the 
exercise was nevertheless a prominent and pennanent feature 
of Nordic foreign policy debates between the two world wars. 
Whereas Britain, France and Gennany did not pay too much 
attention to these discussions, they were closely watched in 
Moscow. l4 According to ID. Kovalevskaia, a Soviet historian, 
the question of a "Nordic bloc" was one of three topics which 
were the principal sources of Soviet-Swedish disagreements in 
the 1930s. The others were the diverging attitudes towards the 
League of Nations (i.e. the discussions about the application 
of Art. 16 of the Covenant), and the Swedish-Finnish plans for 
a remilitarization of the Nand Islands in the late 1930s." 
There is, on the other hand, a more substantial body of 
research on the early post-war years. I have used this literature 
extensively in the part of the study dealing with the post-war 
period." 
As for the interwar period, references to the topic in western 
books and atticles tend to treat it in a highly generalized 
manner. They characterize the Soviet attitude as one of 
disapproval, and suggest, moreover, that the Soviet stand was 
basically stable during the period under review. Nils 0rvik, 
in his otherwise highly valuable study of Norwegian security 
policy from 1920 to 1939, stated that "the Russians had 
always been opposed to the creation of a Nordic bloc", and 
that they opposed "all tendencies towards the creation of a 
military alliance in Scandinavia". The Soviets, 0rvik claimed, 
feared that a Nordic or Scandinavian bloc would come under 
German influence, and that the self-declared neutrality of the 
Scandinavian countries in the second half of the 1930s in and 
by itself made schemes of regional cooperation unattractive 
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from the Soviet perspective of "collective security"." Egil 
Danielsen, in his book on Norwegian-Soviet relations 1917-
1940, also suggests that Soviet opposition to Nordic military 
cooperation was of a pennanent nature. The very existence of 
such an idea, In his opinion, constituted a strain on relations 
between the two countries." Standard general works on 
SCandinavian foreign policy in the interwar period hardly 
mention the topic, or fail to identify the evolution of the 
Soviet position"" 
This holds true for scholarly works on narrower aspects of 
Nordic foreign policies in the interwar period as well. The 
general argument is that the Soviet Union opposed the 
fonnation of a Nordic bloc, without much further discussion. 
For instance, Max lakobson refers to a traditional Russian 
opposition to the idea (specifically with regard to Finnish-
Swedish military cooperation),20 while L.A. Puntila, in a work 
on Finnish political history, asserts that both Gennany and the 
Soviet Union were "suspicious" of Nordic military co-
operation.21 
Gustaf Mannemeim, as part of his critique of Finland's refusal 
to come to tenns with the Soviet Union during the Finnish-
Soviet negotiations of 1938-39, was one among the few who 
were able to notice the nuaoces in the Soviet position. In his 
memoirs he argues that the Soviet Union, under certain 
conditions, may have been prepared to accept extended 
military cooperation between the Nordic countries." 
As far as Soviet authors are concerned, they are more nuanced 
in their discussion. It should be noted, however, that there is 
no extensive Soviet literature on the topic. Nordic cooperation 
is usually discussed within the context of Finnish policies. 
Until the advent of "new thinking" in Soviet foreign policy in 
the late 1980s and the ensuing revitalization of Soviet foreign 
policy studies, Soviet authors strongly condemned Finnish 
foreign policy in the interwar period, viewing Finland's 
"Scandinavian orientation" as camouflage for Finland's anti-
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Soviet policies.23 Soviet authors nevertheless indicate that the 
Soviet attitude to Nordic political and military cooperation was 
more complex than is apparent in the westem worlts referred 
to above. E.M. Samoteikin. discussing Norwegian foreign 
policy in the interwar period. says that the idea of a defensive 
military bloc in the North was widely discussed in the period 
leading up to the Munich agreement of 1938. Such a "regional 
defensive organization" would primarily be directed against 
Gennan aggression. The idea. according to Samotelldn. met 
"understanding and sympathy" in Moscow. but was opposed 
by social democrats in Norway and Denmarlc." Aleksandr Kan. 
in his book on the modem history of Sweden. sees both the 
failure of the idea of Nordic military cooperation and the 
simultaneous rejection in Scandinavia of the Soviet-sponsored 
policy of "collective security" in the second half of the 1930s 
as symptomatic of the ill-considered foreign policies of the 
Scandinavian countries.'" More recently a Soviet historian has 
argued that the Soviet Union sought "to connect the Scandi-
navian orientation in Finnish foreign policies [in the latter half 
of the 1930s] with the Soviet policy of isolating the potential 
aggressor - fascist Gennany". i.e. encouraging Finnish partici-
pation in an anti-Gennan Nordic cooperative venture. The 
attempt came to nothing. according to the author. largely due 
to Nordic. particularly Finnish. policies.'" 1.0. Kova1evskaia. in 
an article on Soviet-Swedish relations in the 1930s. implies 
that the Soviet Union at one point (1937-38) was prepared to 
"assist" (sodeistvovat) in the creation of a Scandinavian 
defence union (the anitude to Finland's place in the system is. 
as so often. not made explicit)." 
There is no work which explicitly discusses Soviet attitudes 
.to Nordic cooperation during the Second World War. The 
negative Soviet stand, however, was made clear on a number 
of occasions. and there is hardly any need for more detailed 
. studies." Soviet policies towards Scandinavia during the war 
strictly reflected overall Soviet global policies. 
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The most detailed study of Soviet attitudes towards Nordic 
cooperation from the end of the war to the late 1950s is the 
work by Tom M. Hetland, which incorporated and largely 
confirmed the main findings of earlier works by other aut-
hors."" Moreover, by making extensive use of Norwegian 
. archives and Soviet press materials, Hetland was able to 
identify and follow the evolution of the Soviet position in 
much more detail than the historians of the interwar period 
mentioned above. In his major study, Hetland discusses the 
evolution of the Soviet position from the early post-war years 
until 1958,· and also presents a set of sensible intelpretations 
of Soviet policies. He documents the negative Soviet stand 
. towards Nordic cooperation after the war, but also discusses 
signs of a more relaxed Soviet attitudes in the 1950s. In the 
last part of the present study there are numerous references 
to Hetland's wolk. 
* .... 
This study is based on printed Soviet diplomatic correspon-
dence and documents, on articles in Soviet, Comintern, and 
Scandinavian - mostly communist - newspapers and journals, 
and on documents in the archives of the Norwegian, Swedish, 
and Danish Ministries of Foreign Affairs. In Moscow I have 
made a first search in the Foreign Policy Archives of the 
Russian Federation and in the former CPSU archives. Apan 
from the archives in Moscow, I· have been able to consult 
those parts of the Comintern archives, mainly concerning 
Norwegian affairs, which are available on microfonn at the 
Archives of the Labour Movement in Oslo. I have also 
included some materials from the National Archives in Wash-
ington, D.C., and the Public Record Office in London. 
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Great vlsions. small results: Nordic dis-
cussions qfmilitary cooperation. 1918-1949 
Small stateJ'attempts to create schemes of extensive military 
cooperation tend to attract a measlU'e of internal and external 
attention and cOncern that may seem out of proportion with 
the mostly meagre results that come out of the discussions. 
This was certainly so in the· case of Nordic military coope-
ration in the period between the two World Wars and in the 
early post-war years. Although this idea was a constant 
feature of Nordic foreign and defence policy discussions in the 
1920s and 1930s. during and after the war until 194849. it 
never came close to realization in any form. To Scandinavian 
policy makers. the increased military strength that would be 
derived from Nordic military cooperation was not sufficient to 
outweigh the fear that such cooperation itself would increase 
the importance of the region in the strategic calculations of 
(he great powers and thus reduce rather than augment its 
seclU'ity. 
The only significant attempt at open military cooperation 
before the Second World War - the Swedish-Finnish plan for 
a joint remilitarization of the AIand Islands - came to nothing 
due to the Soviet veto in May 1939.30 This notwithstanding. 
the prospects for the creation of some sort of military-political 
"bloc" of the Northern countries figured prominently in the 
Soviet press coverage of Northern affairs from the late 1920s 
onwards and in Soviet diplomacy towards the countries 
involved until the eve of the war. Although the Scandinavian 
discussions in 1948-49 were far more extensive than the short 
interlude in March 1940. the negotiations seemed doomed 
from the very beginning: the disparate foreign policy OIlen-
tations of mainly Norway and Sweden all but excluded a 
Scandinavian solution. Despite these dire prospects for the 
evolution of Nordic political and military cooperation after the 
Second World War. it was among the major tasks of Soviet 
diplomats and propaganda in the Northern countries to 
counteract the idea. 
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The very existence of a Nordic debate about defence coope-
ration bred Soviet apprehension. Reading the Soviet press from 
the late 1920s without knowing the real situation in the 
Northern countries, one would get the impression that the 
"Nordic defence union" was close to realization~ Before 
embarldng on the discussion of Soviet views, some wotds 
should be said about the fate of Nordic military cooperation 
from the 1920s to the failure of the Scandinavian aiternative 
in 1949. 
Among the supponers of Nordic military cooperation it was 
generally accepted that Sweden would have to play the key 
role in a common defence arrangement, due to its geographical 
position as the "central" Scandinavian state and its superior 
military, industrial and demographic resources. From the point 
of view of the Swedish government, however, a Notdic 
military bloc was at no point a realistic option. Rickatd 
Sandler, Swedish minister of foreign affairs during most of the 
1930s, may have been personally sympathetic to the idea; at 
least he refused to reject it altogether. But Sandler's views 
were hardly representative of Per Albin Hansson's social-
democratic government. Sweden, with its significant defence 
industry and comparatively strong military forces, was deeply 
attached to its traditional policy of neutrality and sought to 
maintain a position independent of great-power support. 
Sweden also tended to oppose any schemes which might 
disturb the existing balance of power in the Baltic area, and 
kept aloof from the affairs of its neighbours across the Baltic 
sea. 
Norway opposed any talk of a military alliance with the other 
Nordic countries. To the Norwegians, the country's best 
defence was its geographical position on the periphery of 
Europe and British self-interest in upholding Norway's 
independence. The belief in the British "implicit guarantee" 
was deeply ingrained in the Norwegian foreign policy estab-
lishment, whatever the party affiliation of the foreign minister 
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at any given moment. Halvdan Kohl, foreign minister from 
March 1935 until after the country's occupation by Gennan 
forces in the spring of 1940, showed no interest in the idea. 
Being generally sceptical about the capacity of military power 
to safeguard the security of small countries, he favoured as a 
more reliable solUtion Norway's and the North's dis-
. engagement from European great power politics. Struggling 
to combine two set of foreign policy orientations, one highly 
idealist and the other strictly realist, he nevertheless envisaged 
himself in the role of a mediator between the antagonistic 
great powers in Europe. Having a strong belief in personal 
diplomacy and the mission of the small countries, Koht 
regarded military matters as being largely outside his purview. 
During the 19308 Denmark became increasingly vulnerable to 
Gennan pressure, and looked, just like Norway, to London for 
support. While hoping for British support, the Danish govern-
ment felt compelled to come to tenns with Gennany. The 
Danes doubted that a system of Nordic military cooperation 
could do much to back up their own defence in the south. In 
March 1937 Denmarl!:'s social-ilemocratic prime minister, 
Thorvald Stauning, unequivocally rejected the idea of a Nordic 
military bloc as a solution to Denmarlc's security problems . 
. The one Northern country which showed real interest in 
Nordic military cooperation was Finland. Like Denmarlc, but 
unlike Norway and Sweden until the late 1930s, Finland easily 
identified and visualized the probable source of a future threat 
to the country's security and integrity. The Finnish reaction, 
however, differed from Denmarlc's. While Denmark hoped that 
a policy of non-provocation and neutrality would keep the 
country out of a war, Finland actively looked for ways to 
supplement the country's own limited military resources and 
capabilities by way of political and military cooperation. 
Sweden was assigned a key role in the Finnish scheme, while 
Norway and particularly Denmarlc were less important. The 
idea of a Finnish-Swedish remilitarization of the AIand 
archipelago, which gradually came on the political agenda in 
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the two countries from the mid-1930s, was only the most 
ambitious among the Finnish attempts to initiate Nordic and 
Finnish-Swedish defence cooperation. The initiative was clearly 
on the Fmnish side, and it tumed out that Sweden was unwil-
ling to pursue the plans in face of Soviet opposition. Apart 
from the Alarui question, there were also discussions about 
Swedish deliveries of military equipment to Finland and help 
in the development of Finnish defence industry. Finland 
wanted some kind of agreement that would guarantee Swedish 
weapons supplies even in times of war, but no formal 
agreement on this was ever reached.31 
The Soviet-German relationship went from bad to worse after 
the outbreak of the civil war in Spain in the summer of 1936, 
and in the Scandinavian countries and in the West it was 
widely assumed that in case of a war between Germany and 
the Soviet Union, both states might seek to acquire bases or 
strategic territories in the Northern countries. In this situation 
the Scandinavian and foreign press again discussed whether the 
Nordic countries would respond by creating some form of 
military alliance. Halvdan Koht, on the eve of the foreign 
ministers' conference in Helsinki in April 1937, repudiated the 
rumours as baseless." Similar declarations came from the 
Swedish and the Danish foreign ministers. 
The Nordic countries succeeded, however, in establishing a 
degree of cooperation in matters of foreign affairs, especially 
with regard to their policy towards the League of N alions and 
in defining common rules of neutrality in times of war. 
Cooperation in this field reached back to the years of the First 
World War, when Sweden, Norway and Denmark to a certain 
degree succeeded in coordinating their economic policies and 
their policies towards the belligerent great powers. The 
cooperation was renewed in the 1920s, and from the mid-
1930s Scandinavian foreign policy cooperation became Nordic, 
as it was gradually extended to include Finland. 
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In the Northern countries, the Second World War struck a 
heavy blow both to the idea of traditional neutrality and to the 
prospects for Nordic cooperation When the war ended, 
Finland, before the war the strongest supporter of Nordic 
political and military cooperation, was no longer In a position 
to freely pursue its pre-war policies towards its Scandinavian 
neighbours. Limited functional defence cooperation between 
Norway and Sweden. which began during the war when the 
Norwegians were allowed to set up military training camps on 
Swedish territory, continued after the war. Attempts in 1947 
to develop forms of bilateral and trilateral technical defence 
cooperation in Scandinavia led to only small results." 
Only with the onset of the cold war did Sweden, Norway and 
Denmark once more start seriously to discuss forms of defence 
cooperation or alliance. Discussions in 194849 in the three 
countries centered on two solutions - a Scandinavian and an 
Atlantic (i.e. adherence to the North Atlantic Treaty). The 
Swedes were bent on preserving their non-aligned status and 
therefore argued the case for a ScandInavian military union 
without undue ties to any of the two emerging political-
military blocs. When these talks failed, Sweden remained non-
aligned while Norway and Denmark joined the Atlantic Pact. 
Finland was never brought Into the discussions. 
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The fOllilation qf Soviet attitudes: 1918-
1934 
The period from the October revolution until the early 1930s 
constitutes the formative period of Soviet foreign policies, 
when basic attitudes, Soviet foreign policy aims and strategies 
evolved. There were two lines of Soviet policies and attitudes 
towards Nordic political and mUirary cooperation in the 1920s 
and early 1930s: one basically negative, the other much more 
positive. This ambiguity reflected two sets of approaches or 
traditions within the Soviet foreign policy establishment. The 
negative, ideologized attitude to Nordic cooperation stemmed 
from what 1 have called the "bolshevik idiosyncratic" inter-
pretation of international politics. The other. more positive 
attitude, reflected a "realpolitik" tradition within the Soviet 
foreign policy establishment. 
After the establishment of Soviet power in Russia the three 
Scandinavian states for a short period came to occupy a 
position of prominence in Soviet foreign policy quite out of 
proportion to their small size and limited influence in world 
politics. This was due partly to their importance as major 
trading partners for Russia until the Soviet government 
succeeded in establishing relations with the great powers in the 
early 19208. partly to their role as "windows" or "bridges" 
between the Isolated revolutionary regime in Moscow and the 
rest of the western world." However, the Scandinavian states 
were soon relegated to their more typical position on the 
periphery of Soviet foreign policy Interest. Soviet interest in 
the Scandinavian states as such being restricted, Soviet 
attention to the airy discussions about Scandinavian or Nordic 
cooperation was even more so. It is hardly surprising. there-
fore. that until the late 19208 there were few allusions to 
Nordic or Scandinavian cooperation in the Soviet press. The 
1920s are also the period when the two Soviet approaches, the 
basically negative bolshevik idiosyncratic and the positive 
realpolitik.coexisted. although the negative attitude to Nordic 
regional cooperation dominated Soviet propaganda. 
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Negative Soviet attitudes in the 1920s: the Baltic 
connection 
Treating Scandinavia as an area of limited direct interest to the 
Soviet Union. the Soviet government was much more con-
cerned with developments in the Baltic area. including Finland 
and Swedish policies towards the Baltic states. The Soviets 
were therefore acutely sensitive to anything that might be 
interpreted as signs of closer cooperation between Sweden and 
Scandinavia on the one hand. and some combination of 
Finland and the three Baltic states and Poland on the other." 
The Soviets were convinced (partly rightly so) that the British 
and the French encouraged the creation of Baltic-Scandinavian 
groupings as one element in their anti-Soviet policies." 
As a result. mutual visits by leading politicians and other 
contacts across the Baltic Sea repeatedly evoked expressions 
of Soviet concern. When the Estonian foreign minister visited 
Sweden in the autumn 1928. V.L. Kopp. at that time the 
Soviet envoy to Stockholm. wrote to Moscow that this was 
"far more" than a courtesy visit. According to Kopp. the visit 
was symptomatic of the desire among the three Baltic states 
to create a Baltic entente without Poland's participation. The 
implications for the Soviet Union were therefore unclear. Kopp 
pointed out that Sweden's Baltic policies were less anti-Soviet 
that Poland's. At the same time the Soviet envoy saw signs of 
a growing Swedish "activism" in the Baltic region. Sweden's 
Baltic policy should therefore be closely watched." 
At approximately the same time as Kopp made his comments, 
the Soviet press published a number of articles warning against 
Frencll and British plans to create an anti-Soviet Scandinavian-
Baltic "bloc". In a speech to the Central Executive Com-
mittee" in December 1929 Maxim Litvinov. the deputy 
Commissar. warned that "certain Swedish circles" entertained 
imperialistic designs towards the East. Kopp, on the other 
hand. had made it clear that such tendencies were not part of 
the official Swedish foreign policy." in a report summing up 
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developments in Swedish foreign policy during 1929, Kopp 
continued his analysis along these more sober lines. Sweden, 
according to Kopp, was clearly reorienting herself from 
Gennany towards Britain and France. Poland's Scandinavian 
aspirations, which the Soviets violently opposed, found no 
support in Sweden. Kopp made no mention of Swedish 
activism in the Baltic region. . 
Gradually, however, the Soviets started to show signs of worry 
about alleged plans to create a system of intensified coope-
ration between the Northern countries. A series of alarmist 
articles in the Soviet press culminated for the time being with 
an authoritative comment in lzvestiia in August 1929 about the 
"Northern entente"." Tbe article alluded to an older plan, 
which, however, only recently had materialized as an "anti-
Soviet Baltic-Scandinavian bloc" of a military character 
inspired by Britain. The Soviets were still primarily concerned 
by the Baltic connection: the author of the article argued that 
efforts to create this "bloc" had its origin and main support in 
the Baltic states, Finland and Poland. But also the "increasing 
imperialist tendencies of the Swedish bourgeoisie" implied 
support for a Nordic bloc. The author implied that "The 
Northern entente" was already a reality and constituted a threat 
to the Soviet Union.41 In the following years articles of similar 
content continued to appear in the Soviet press. In March 
1932, for instance, Krasnaia Gazeta (a Leningrad newspaper) 
reiterated the warnings against the creation of some sort of 
"Pan-Balticum" or "Northern Entente", which by their very 
nature would be anti-Soviet." 
These and similar Soviet signals defined the predominant 
Soviet position for the following years. The articles in the 
Soviet press were no doubt intended as a warning against the 
creation of any system of military cooperation between the 
Nordic countries. Specifically, the Soviet Union made clear 
its opposition to the extension of contacts between the 
Scandinavian states, Finland and the Baltic states. It should 
be noted that Soviet policies towards Scandinavia already at 
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this stage, i.e. before the spectre of Soviet-Geman war arose 
after ffitler's accession to power, was closely related to the 
state of Soviet-Flnnish relations and Soviet policy towards 
Finland. The Soviets were probably aware of the fact that no 
plans existed for any Nordic or Scandinavian-BlIltic political 
or military "bloc", and their signalling was primarily preven-
tive in nature. To be sure, Litvinov told the Norwegian 
minister in Moscow that he did not treat the lI1Iegations about 
the "Northern entente" too seriously." 
Summing up: until the early 1930s Soviet attitudes towards 
Nordic or Scandinavian cooperation operated largely within 
the broader context of Soviet policies towards the Baltic area. 
In the last years of the period, however, the Soviets started to 
signal their opposition to any schemes of Nordic cooperation, 
even without the Baltic connection. Throughout, Soviet 
propaganda saw cooperation in Northern Europe against the 
backdrop of alleged hostile intentions of the western great 
powers, primarily Britain. 
The positive stand: the views of Georgii V. Chicherin 
Apart from the dominant trend, which tended to oppose II1I 
Ioms of Nordic and Baltic cooperation, there was an alter-
native, realpolitik, interpretation within the Soviet foreign 
policy establishment. 
An alternative, generally positive, attitude to small-state 
cooperation in general and Nordic cooperation in particular 
was formulated in the mid-1920s by Georgii V. Chicherin, 
commissar for foreign affairs from 1918 to 1930. Pragmati-
cally analyzing the role of small states in international 
politics, Chicherin recognized the potential advantages for 
Soviet security of Nordic political and military cooperation. 
His basic argument was that only through cooperation could 
the Northern countries make up a credible "buffer" between 
the Soviet Union and the hostile Western great powers. 
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One should bear in mind, however, that Chicherin, especially 
after Lenin's death in 1924, had limited access to the inner 
circle of top-level decision-makers and that he was mostly 
isolated from the rest of the Soviet leadership." For reasons of 
health Chicherin was also often absent from Moscow for 
periods up to several months, during which the leadership of 
the Commissariat was in the hands of his deputy Maksim 
Litvinov, who during the last years of Chicherin's tenure took 
over the actually control over the Commissariat TItis double 
leadership of the Commissariat most certainly contributed to 
the ambiguity of Soviet policies in this and other matters. 
In a series of talks with the Danish minister in Moscow in the 
mid 1920s Georgii Chicherin presented views about the role 
of the smaller states in European· politics in general and 
Scandinavian cooperation in particular which were strikingly 
at variance with the negative attitude towards small-state 
cooperation which dominated Soviet official thinking as 
presented above. While Chicherin made similar but apparently 
less frequent mention of the topic in his conversations with 
the Swedish envoy, there are no references to it in the 
archives of the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs." 
ACCOrding to the Danish envoy, Chicherin repeatedly returned 
to what the Dane dubbed Chicherin's "favourite thought"; the 
need to create a Scandinavian or Nordic defence union. An 
alliance between the Scandinavian states, Chicherin argued, 
would be sufficiently strong to be taken seriously by the great 
powers. He deplored that the close Scandinavian cooperation 
which had developed during the First World War had faded 
when hostilities ended .... 
Chicherin's support for Scandinavian cooperation was part of 
his general thinking about the role of smaller states in 
European politics. The smaller states, he argued, should 
strengthen their cooperation. He also pointed specifically to 
the possibility of some cooperative ventures between Scandi-
navia and the smaller states of "Central Europe". Although it 
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is hard to establish the exact meaning of Chicherin's words -
the Danish minister, unfortunately, was not very precise in his 
reports - one is tempted to conclude that what Chicherin had 
in mind was some sort of closer cooperation between Scandi-
navia and the Baltic states. By cooperating, Chicherin argued, 
Europe's smaller states could play a useful role as strong 
buffers between the Soviet Union and the hostile Western 
great powers.47 
Other elements of Chicherin's conversations with the Danish 
envoy reveal the strategic thinking and "realpolitik" rationale 
of his remaIts. He related the arguments in favour of Scandi-
navian and small-state cooperation directly to a critique of the 
Danish policy of unilateral disarmament Small-state coope-
ration, he argued, only had sense if the smaller states were 
sufficiently armed and thus in a position to resist great power 
aggression by force of arms. Only then would the smaller 
powers be allowed to conduct their own independent foreign 
policy." Without a strong military establishment, the smaller 
states would lose all international influence. 
Chicherin pointed out that the Danish conservatives, who 
argued against the government's disarmament programme, had 
a better grasp of the political reality than the liberals and the 
leftist parties, whom he unkindly dubbed "defence nihilist". 
Even limited military forces, Chicherin argued, would make a 
difference in a great power conflict, when the main antagonists 
would be hardly pressed to use the available forces on the 
main battlefronts." 
Apart from his general reasoning about the role of small states 
in a world dominated by great powers, Chicherin's "campaign" 
for Danish rearmament and the creation of a Scandinavian 
military bloc was closely related to his concern with the use 
of and control over the entrances to the Baltic, the Sound and 
the Danish Belts. His main preoccupation was the possibility 
of a British intervention or invasion against the Soviet Union 
in the Baltic area. Chicherin wanted the Danish government to 
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commit itself to some sort of closing of the Belts in case of 
war in the Baltic area. Denmark, Chicherin argued, had the 
"key to the Baltic Sea". He made a point of drawing para11els 
to the Fint World War, when DenmllIk: had mined the Belts, 
thereby blocking allied help to Russia. He told the Danish 
minister that the Soviet government hoped that DenmllIk: 
would use its capacity to close the Belts also in a situation 
when this would benefit Russia. 50 Furthennore, he stressed that 
DenmllIk:'s ability to block the entrances to the Baltic would 
be undennil)ed by its policy of disarmament Finally, Chicherin 
argued that if DenmllIk: disarmed, the British would not 
hesitate to establish a "Malta in the Baltic" on one of the 
Danish islands." 
Thus, Chicherin's "realpolitik" approach to matters of Nordic 
and small-state cooperation led him to conclusions which 
directly contradicted what was in the process of being 
formulated as the dominant S01liet attitude. Being able to 
differentiate between the policies of capitalist countries, 
Chicherin felt that the smaller states in Europe, through 
cooperation, coordination andpooling of their resources, could 
constitute a third element, a "buffer", between the S01liet 
Union and the hostile western great powers, thereby gi1ling the 
S01liet Union additional security against an attack by the 
Western great powers. 
It seems also clear that Chicherin's views on Danish defence 
policies were partly at odds with that of his colleagues in the 
Commissariat, including his deputy Litvinov." In a letter to 
Litvinov from November 1929, i.e. oIily two years after 
Chicherin criticized the Danish disarmament programme, the 
Soviet minister to Copenhagen ridiculed the arguments used by 
the opponents of complete Danish disarmament. Putting 
Chicherin's reasoning on its head, Kobetskii concluded that the 
only rationale of Danish military forces would be to create an 
excuse for the British to take control o1ler the Baltic entran-
ces." 
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On the other hand, Chicherin was not isolated in his concern 
about the importance of the Baltic entrances to the Soviet 
Union's security. His attempts to influence the Danish towards 
committing themselves to closing the Belts in times of war, 
were parallelled by repeated Soviet expressions of concern 
over Danish and Swedish plans to deepen the shallow entran-
ces to the Baltic Sea through the Sound. The Russians argued 
that Danish and Swedish plans for the deepening of Flinte-
renden and Drogden (the main passages in the Sound) were 
inspired by London and designed to open the passages to the 
Baltic for even the largest (British) warships. In a letter to the 
Soviet minister to Copenhagen Chicherin characterized as 
"ridiculous" Danish and Swedish assurances that there were 
no military considerations involved in the plans whatsoever.'" 
The Soviet government made at least one weak formal attempt 
in the interwar period to get international sanction to a closing 
of the Baltic Sea to warships of non-littoral states. During the 
Rome conference on naval disarmament in February 1924 the 
Russian delegate demanded "as a preliminary step to all 
discussions of naval disarmament by Russia that the Black and 
Baltic Seas should be made inaccessible to the warships of all 
powers except those of the littoral states. ,,50 The idea of a 
"neutralization" of the Baltic Sea, which figured in discussions 
between Finland, the three Baltic States, Poland and Britain in 
the first tumultuous years following the First World War, was 
of a different origin. In this version, the primary aim of the 
"neutralization" was to reduce the power of the Russian Baltic 
Fleet. However, some of the proponents of a "neutralization" 
of the Baltic, among them J.H. Vennola, prime minister of 
Finland from spring 1921, linked "neutralization" to the 
closing of the Baltic Sea to warships of non-littoral states. In 
the Finnish-Russian peace agreement of October 14, 1920, the 
two parties pledged (art. 12) "to support the idea of the 
neutralization of the Gulf of Finland and the whole of the 
Baltic Sea" and to work towards the realization of this idea. 
In his speech at the Lausanne conference on 19 December 
1922 Chicherin argued that the Soviet government during the 
26 
peace negotiations with the Baltic states had proposed the 
neutralization of the Baltic Sea on the condition that it would 
be guaranteed by the other great powers and not cross vital 
Russian state interests." 
Concerns about the control over the Baltic entrances in case 
of war continued to figure prominently in Soviet policy 
towards DeIlIllllIk. It played a certain, although less prominent 
role, in Soviet-Swedish relations. In the early 1930s the 
Soviets apparently felt that the British were strengthening their 
influence in Scandinavia and their control over the entrances 
to the Baltic. The Soviets suspected that DenmaIX had 
undertaken secret commitments towards Britain and Prance 
regarding the control over the straits in times of war, directed 
against the Soviet Union. The matter of who would effectively 
control the Baltic entrances was probably the main factor in 
Soviet evaluations of Danish military policies in the 1920s and 
early 1930s." 
However, Chicherin's views on Scandinavian and Nordic 
cooperation and small-state collaboration in general were 
clearly at variance with the predominant Soviet position as it 
could be gauged from public declarations and press com-
ments. It was common knowledge that attempts at small-state 
combinations in the Soviet Union's neighbourllood ~ere met 
with official suspicion in Moscow. The Soviet Union, more-
over, prepared the ground for Soviet bilateral pacts or agree-
ments which each of the neighbouring states as an alternative 
to bilateral or multilateral schemes without Soviet partici-
pation.51 
Beginrting in the mid 1920s, the Soviet envoys to the Scan-
dinavian capitals conducted irregular talks with the three 
countries' ministries of foreign affairs about the initiation of 
bilateral agreements or pacts of non-aggression and the 
peaceful solution of conflicts. Nothing, however, came out of 
these talks, basically because the Soviet were interested in 
pacts of non-aggression, while the Scandinavians primarily 
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envisaged agreements about procedures for conciliation and 
aIbitration. The matter was put to rest for the remainder of 
the interwar period after Iohan Ludvig Mowinckel, the 
Norwegian minister of foreign affairs, unsuccessfully raised 
the matter during the Nordic foreign ministers' meeting in 
Stockholm in September 1934. The limited Soviet interest in 
reaching an agreement with the Scandinavian countries - the 
talks were not raised to the level of fonnal negotiations -
made it once more clear that Scandinavia after all was less 
involved in Soviet security interests than the Baltic region." 
1934-35: The Soviet campaign against Nordic 
cooperation 
Scandinavian foreign policies and Scandinavian or Nordic 
cooperation seldom· figured prominently in Soviet foreign 
policy statements and propaganda in the 1920s and early 
1930s. Discussions of Nordic topics were mostly reflecting 
Soviet concerns about developments in the Baltic region. 
However, this situation gradually changed after Hitler's 
accession to power in 1933 and the ensuing rise of tension in 
Europe: from that time Scandinavia once more occupied a 
position of its own in Soviet foreign policy and strategic 
calculations. 
The renewed Soviet interest in Scandinavian foreign and 
security policies culminated for the time being in the autumn 
of 1934, when the Soviets launched a campaign in the Soviet 
press and through diplomatic channels against alleged plans 
to create a military-political "bloc" of the three Scandinavian 
countries and Finland. This time the Soviets viewed the spectre 
of Nordic cooperation as one element in German aggressive 
plans. Evaluations of Finland's position played a key role in 
Soviet deliberations. 
The campaign, which started in the autumn of 1934 and 
reverberated into 1935, was symptomatic of the process of 
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reorientation which was going on in the Soviet foreign policy 
establishment Even against the backdrop of the emerging 
Gennan threat, the Soviet leadership was unable to detect the 
fundamental division which existed within the capitalist world 
and adjust their policies accordingly. At most the spectre of 
Nordic cooperation was therefore linked to the actual threat, 
i.e. fascist Gennany, although Soviet propaganda was still 
unable to free itself from the traditional idea of England as 
the main threat in N orthem Europe. For good measure, 
therefore, plans for Northern cooperation were often seen as 
expressions of Gennan and British designs. Only the recogni-
tion of the existence of common interests between the Soviet 
Union and the non-fascists capitalist world, as expressed in the 
Soviet-French pact of May 2, 1935, paved the ground for 
Soviet support for small-state regional systems as potential 
bastions of stability and security in Europe. More than two 
years passed from Hitler's accession to power in January 1933 
to the final victory of "collective security" and "popular fronts" 
in the summer of 1935. Until this, the ideologized "bolshevik" 
interpretation continued to dominate Soviet attitudes to Nordic 
cooperation. 
The Soviet campaign was an expression of the basic assump-
tion that any change of the strategic status quo in Northern 
Europe would benefit the aggressive powers, mainly Gennany. 
Soviet concerns were heightened by developments in the 
Northern countries themselves, where the idea of Northern 
cooperation, and specifically the idea of Nordic defence 
cooperation, gradually was broadening its appeal. More than 
anything else the Soviets were concerned about the reper-
cussions of the gradual inclusion of Finland into what had 
until now been "Scandinavian" rather than "Nordic" coope-
ration. 
In October and November 1934 the Soviet foreign language 
publications Deutsche Zentral-Zeitung and Le Journal de 
Moscou published a number of articles attacking the foreign 
poliCies of the Scandinavian countries and Finland. The press 
29 
campaign culminated with an anicle in Pravda on 17 Novem-
ber under the title "The Scandinavian military bloc". 
Pravda argued that the Stockholm conference of the Nordic 
foreign ministers in September 1934, where the Finnish foreign 
minister panicipated for the first time," had led to the 
formation of a "political bloc" of the four Nordic countries 
and had stimulated Scandinavian and Finnish "militarism". 
Discussions in the Scandinavian press made it clear, according 
to Pravda, that even military cooperation between the four 
countries was now on the political agenda. The anicle referred 
specifically to a commentary in the Swedish Stockholms 
Tidningen and an anicle in the Norwegian journal Janus. The 
Janus anicle in panicular, it was argued, made it clear that the 
ideas of Nordic military cooperation were primarily directed 
against the Soviet Union, mainly serving Germany's interests. 
German newspapers had discussed the question of a remilitari-
zation of the Aland Islands and building of fortifications along 
the Sound, and had signalled German interest in Scandinavian 
military cooperation. Germany, according to Pravda, actually 
aimed at making the Baltic Sea "a German lake", utilizing the 
Nordic countries as a place d' armes for its aggressive pur-
poses. 
Finland was the primary target of the Soviet attacks. The 
anicles pointed to the close links existing between Finnish 
and German military circles. Finland was characterized as the 
"link" between the "Scandinavian bloc" and "fascist Germany". 
and was allegedly increasing its influence over the foreign 
policies of the three Scandinavian countries." 
The' press campaign in the autumn 1934 was parallelled by 
Soviet diplomatic efforts. In late October Harald Fallenius, 
first secretary at the Swedish legation in Moscow, was told in 
the NKID that Sweden was coming under Finnish influence, 
which had led to the appearance of an anti-Soviet front of the 
two countries. The NKID pointed to the four Nordic countries' 
refusal to sign the letter inviting the Soviet Union to become 
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a member of the League of Nations," and also referred to 
Swedish press discussions and the attitude of authoritative 
Swedish military circles. Boris Shtein and Aleksandra Kollon-
tai, the Soviet ministers in Finland and· Sweden, made similar 
statements to Swedish diplomats in Helsinki and Stockholm 
respectively, stressing that Moscow was concemed by an 
alleged increased Fmnish influence on the Scandinavian 
countries' foreign policy orientation."' The Norwegian minister 
in Moscow, Andreas T. Urbye, who unsuccessfully tried to 
convince the Soviets that any talk of a Nordic military bloc 
was far off the mm, got the impression that they "viewed the 
matter more seriously than I thought possible". He was told 
that the Soviet Union had observed "a changed attitude toward 
the Soviet Union" of the Scandinavian governments after the 
foreign ministers' conference in Stockholm. Once more the 
Soviets pointed to the failure of the Nordic countries to sign 
the letter inviting the Soviet Union to become a member of 
the League of Nations." 
Ivan Maiski, Soviet ambassador to London, alluded to the 
existence among the Nordic countries of "some kind of 
political understanding directed against the Soviet Union", and 
dismayed the Norwegian minister in London by speaking about 
a "military alliance"." The Danish minister in Moscow was 
told that the very existence in Denmark of a press discussion 
of "a military alliance of the four countries directed against the 
USSR" cast a shadow on the relationship between Copenhagen 
and Moscow." Both the press campaign and the diplomatic 
efforts abated towards the end of the year. 
Scandinavian and Finnish discussions of defence cooperation 
were closely related to disputes over the size of the defence 
budgets in the four countries. Not surprisingly, the Soviets 
warned against any increase in Scandinavian or Finnish 
defence allocations. Even after the campaign against the 
alleged Nordic military "bloc" had culminated, the Soviets 
continued to view agitation in the Nordic countries for 
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increased defence spending as a right-wing "militaristic", 
"nationalistic" and anti-Soviet course of action."' 
At this point the Soviet government gave unreserved support 
to the neutralist elements in the Scandinavian countries. In 
1933 the Soviet minister to Oslo argued in a letter to the 
NKID that the Soviet Union should do what it could to help 
Norway remain neutral in case of war. For this reason the 
Soviet Union should avoid everything that might lead to 
frictions between the two countries." 
The Soviet concern about the prospect of intensified Nordic 
cooperation was also mirrored in the Scandinavian communist 
press. For instance, an article in early 1935 in the Danish 
Kommunistisk tidsskrift reiterated the arguments from the 
Soviet press campaign. Under the heading ''The Scandinavian 
Bloc" it attacked the proponents of Scandinavian rearmament, 
and also the idea of Scandinavian military cooperation. The 
author was particularly worried by alleged plans for a joint 
Swedish-Danish fortification along the Sound. A closing of the 
Baltic entrances in times of war, it was argued, would give 
Germany a free hand to pursue its anti-Soviet aims in the 
Baltic. This argument, which contradicted the earlier Soviet 
attempts to achieve a closing of the straits to warships of non-
littoral states, clearly reflected the turn in Soviet thinking 
towards viewing Germany rather than England as the primary 
threat to Soviet security. The article concluded that the Nordic 
foreign ministers had discussed issues of military cooperation 
during their meeting in September." 
An examination of the Norwegian communist daily Arbeideren 
for the years 1934-39 reveals the close identity of views and 
arguments between the Soviets and their followers in Nor-
way.'· During 1934 and 1935 Arbeideren vigorously opposed 
all plans for increased Norwegian defence efforts. Swedish and 
Norwegian social democrats were attacked for their alleged re-
orientation towards accepting increased allocations for military 
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defence. The anti-military stand of the Norwegian Communist 
Party was confirmed at the party's 5th Congress in 1936. 
The rejection of Scandinavian re-atmament was accompanied 
by attacks on the idea of Scandinavian or Nordic cooperation. 
Echoing the Soviet press, Arbeideren argued that the foreign 
ministers' conference in September 1934 had approved a 
number of measures with the aim of supporting Germany in 
a war with the Soviet Union. The newspaper concluded that 
"the existence of a Nordic bloc directed against the Soviet 
Union is becoming ever more evident",'1 and demanded that 
the Norwegian government "stop Norway's participation in the 
Nordic anti-Soviet bloc"." Although the signing of the Soviet-
French mutual assistance pact on 2 May 1935, which con-
tained an explicit Soviet endorsement of French defence 
efforts, apparently created some confusion among Norwegian 
communists," they did not yet abandon their negative attitude 
towards Scandinavian defence efforts. 
Needless to say, the position of Arbeideren and the Scandi-
navian communist press resulted from decisions of the highest 
decision-making bodies of the communist parties. In early 
March 1935 the politburo of the Norwegian Communist Party 
(NKP) passed a resolution condemning Norway's participation 
in the preparations for a new "imperialistic war" and a 
"Scandinavian aggressive bloc" ("den skandinaviske krigs-
blokk") headed by Sweden. This "bloc" was directed against 
the Soviet Union and inspired by Germany and (sic) Britain. 
The politburo condemned Scandinavian rearmament, and made 
it clear that it would be a priority task of the Party to 
"unmask" Norway's participation in the anti-Soviet Scandi-
navian "bloc". As an example of the aggressive intentions of 
the Nordic countries, the resolution claimed that the Nordic 
foreign ministers had discussed plans for developing the AIand 
Islands into a "base for the submarine war against the Soviet 
Union" .'4 
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The Soviet campaign, through diplomatic channels and in the 
Soviet and communist press, was obviously an on:hestrated 
one intended to influence Scandinavian and Finnish policies. 
The correspondence between Moscow and the Soviet legations 
in the four Nordic capitals in the autumn of 1934 reveals 
more of the Soviet motivation. In late September Boris S. 
Stomoniakov, deputy commissar for foreign affairs in charge 
of relations with the Nordic countries, argued in a letter to 
madame Kollontai that the creation of a Nordic bloc led by 
Sweden but including Finland would be contrary to Soviet 
interests. A Nordic bloc's policy towards the Soviet Union 
would undoubtedly be strongly influenced by Finland. More 
clearly than the three Scandinavian countries, Finland had a 
strong, albeit hostile interest in relations with the Soviet 
Union. The basically passive attitude of Denmark and Norway, 
together with a lack of will on behalf of Sweden to oppose 
anti-Soviet intrigues, would leave the field open to the Finns." 
Litvinov presented similar arguments a fortnight later. Besides 
Japan, Germany, and Poland, he argued, Finland was "the 
most aggressive country". If Sweden were to move closer to 
Finland it would "consciously or unconsciously be drawn into 
anti-Soviet machinations". If, on the other hand, Finland 
behaved "loyally" and "peacefully" the prospects of Nordic 
cooperation would bee less alarming. Litvinov also referred to 
the League of Nations affair to prove his point." A couple of 
days later Stomoniakov once again argued that recent develop-
ments had demonstrated that the policy towards the Soviet 
Union of a Nordic "bloc" by and large would be dominated 
by Finland." 
Thus the Soviets at this point clearly viewed Nordic political 
and military cooperation as being contrary to Soviet interests. 
The primary reason for Soviet opposition was the danger of 
increased German and Finnish influence in Sweden and the 
other Scandinavian countries. Echoing the ingrained fear of 
British intrigues, and reflecting the Soviet tendency to treat the 
whole capitalist world as one hostile bloc, it was also argued 
that "certain anti-Soviet circles" in Britain viewed a Nordic 
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"bloc" as a an ally in a possible future war with the Soviet 
Union:' Soviet opposition to Nordic cooperation was linked to 
a rejection of Nordic rearmament, and went together with 
support for the neutralist elements in the Nordic countries. 
The Soviet ministers in Copenhagen and Stockholm were 
correspondingly instructed to argue against the fomation of a 
Nordic military bloc when the idea was discussed. Stomon-
iakov also noted with satisfaction that the Soviet press 
campaign went far from unnoticed in Scandinavia. It had 
"reinforced the neutralist elements vis-a-vis the activist 
elements" in the three countries. The Soviet Union should not, 
according to Stomoniakov, remain passive with regard to the 
agitation for a Nordic bloc. It should actively worlt. against the 
movement for Nordic military cooperation, and the 'Scandi-
navian countries should be encouraged to continue their policy 
of "peace and neutrality".70 
However, although the "bolshevik" ideologized approach 
clearly predominated in Soviet policy and propaganda with 
regard to Nordic cooperation, there were traces of Chicherin's 
"realpolitik" legacy among Soviet diplomats and the narkomin-
deltsy in Moscow. Boris Shtein in Helsinki sent the most 
alannist reports, while Kollontai in Stockholm and Bekzadian 
in Oslo were closer to reality in the evaluation of the evo-
lution of Nordic cooperation. Kollontai told the Swedish 
foreign minister that she did not herself want to bring up the 
topic, because she did not believe in the existence of a 
Scandinavian anti-Soviet policy. In conversations with Swedish 
officials she also agreed with the Swedish argument that 
Finland's Scandinavian orientation was in Soviet interest'· 
Even Boris Stomoniakov, the deputy Commissar in charge of ' 
Nordic affairs, agreed during a private conversations that the . 
Soviet Union should welcome Finland's coming closer to the 
three Scandinavian countries.81 Beresov, Stomoniakov' s succes-
sor as head of the Northern-Baltic-Polish department, was 
apparently more stubborn in his hostility and suspicion towards 
Finland.1Il 
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1.935-39: the return qf the ''realpolitik'' 
approach 
The consolidation of nazism in Germany and the ensuing rise 
of a major threat to Soviet security in the heart of continental 
Europe triggered a fundamental reevaluation of Soviet foreign 
policy. After 1934-35, the policy of "collective security" and 
''popular fronts" altered the Soviet Union's relationship to the 
non1ascist capitalist world. On the periphery of great-power 
politics, the reevaluation included Soviet attitudes towards 
Nordic cooperation, rearmament and neutrality. The new 
Soviet approach echoed Chicherin's "realpolitik" attitude to 
the role of the Northern countries in international politics. 
The idea of the North as a strategic "buffer" reappeared in 
Soviet thinking. Also regional factors, in particular Soviet 
evaluations of Finnish internal and external politics, still 
played a key role for the evolution of Soviet views. Towards 
the end of the period the Soviets lost interest in the idea of 
Nordic political and military cooperation, having realized that 
closer forms of Nordic defence cooperation would not materia-
lize in the foreseeable future. 
1935-36: Soviet policies in transition 
Until Hitler's accession to power in Gennany, Soviet coverage 
of Nordic affairs had portrayed Great Britain as the most 
aggreSSive anti-Soviet great power with its own designs in 
Northern Europe. This traditional attitude was still reflected in 
the Soviet campaign against Nordic cooperation in 1934-35. 
After the consolidation of Hitler's regime. however. the focus 
shifted unequivocally to Gennany: thereafter Soviet propaganda 
concentrated on the unmasking of Gennan activity and plans 
in the region. On the general level. the Soviet-French pact of 
May 1935 symbolized this change in the Soviet foreign policy 
orientation. 
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In 1935 and 1936, after the campaign against Northern 
cooperation abated in early 1935, articles regularly appeared 
in the Soviet press which attacked the foreign and military 
policies of Finland and the Scandinavian countries. There was 
less talk, however, of the Nordic "bloc", attention being 
focused on alleged German plans to use Scandinavia and 
Finland as a springboard for aggression towards the Easl 
Finland was described as a virtual German ally, and the 
Soviets condemned the idea of military cooperation between 
Sweden and Finland. Such cooperation would be to the benefit 
of Germany. Initially the Soviets also maintained their negative 
attitude towards increased defence efforts in the four Nordic 
countries." 
This replacement of Great Britain with Germany as the Soviet 
Union's main opponent in Northern Europe did not necessarily 
mean that Soviet attitudes towards Nordic cooperation as such 
had changed. In fact, that was a much more gradual process: 
the initial Soviet reaction was to assign to Germany the evil 
ambitions which had previously been assigned to England. 
Only slowly did the new political and strategic landscape in 
Europe lead to a Soviet reappraisal of the role of the Northern 
countries as a power factor of its own in international politics. 
This did not mean, however, that the Soviet approach to the 
Nordic countries and the rest of Europe's smaller states 
remained fixed. One major change followed directly from the 
evolving doctrine of "collective security", the essence of which 
was the construction of security arrangements directed against 
Gennan aggression, and the new Soviet enthusiasm for the 
principles embodied in the Covenant of the League of Nations, 
not least the option of applying sanctions against an aggressor. 
In 1934 the Soviet Union had encouraged the three Scandi-
navian countries to continue their policy of "peace" and 
"neutrality", openly supporting the neutralist elements in these 
countries' political establishments. Now the Soviet attitude 
with regard to Scandinavian and small-state neutrality changed. 
One of the articles alluded to above argued that "a neutral 
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anned Scandinavia" would be welcomed in Gennany.B4 Soon 
the Soviets became more explicit: Scandinavian neutrality was 
to the advantage of GelUlany, while Berlin counted on direct 
Finnish support in their aggressive schemes. IS It soon became 
standard Soviet foreign policy to condemn small-state neutra-
lity as working against the principles of "collective security". D. 
From a Soviet perspective, neutrality presented the Scandi-
navian countries with a particular dilemma. As Tikhmenev, the 
Soviet minister in Copenhagen pointed out in mid-1936, the 
Scandinavian countries would be too weak to defend their 
neutrality without support from one of the great powers even 
if they made serious efforts to strengthen their military 
defence. That is, they would have to choose side, at the same 
time virtually abandoning their "neutrality".n In other words, 
the idea of small-state neutra1ity was an illusion in a world 
dominated by the power politics of the great powers. The 
persistent Soviet attacks on the neutralist policies of the 
Scandinavian countries, which often bordered at ridicule, was 
based on this insight 
It was only logical, therefore, that the Soviets gradually started 
to reevaluate their positions also with regard to Nordic 
political and military cooperation. 
The reasoning inherent in the emerging Soviet position was 
visualized by an article in Moscow Daily News, a newspaper 
aiming primarily at a foreign audience, in September 1935. 
The author took as his point of departure the Nordic foreign 
ministers' meeting which had shortly before been held in Oslo. 
The article was a rare example of a Soviet press commentary 
held in a sober voice, without strong evaluations and the 
customary vicious attacks on the foreign policies of the Nordic 
countries. The author pointed to the limited size of the anned 
forces of the four Nordic countries (Le. also Finland!), even 
when counted together. Echoing Chicherin's argument exactly 
one decade earlier, he argued that even such forces would 
nevertheless make a difference if they supported the same side 
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in a great power war. The author also noted that the Scandi-
navians had refused to develop too close contacts with 
Gennany and Poland, and that Gennany's aggressive posture 
had forced the Scandinavians to pay more attention to their 
anned forces. An example of this was increases in the 
Swedish defence budget, and emerging discussions in Sweden 
about a fortification of the Aland Islands. The author con-
cluded that the Nordic foreign ministers at the conference in 
Oslo had expressed the will of the participating states to 
coordinate their foreign policies." 
The Danish envoy read the article as a sign of an ongoing 
Soviet reevaluation of Nordic cooperation and of Finland's role 
in it He even spoke about .. the new attitude to Scandinavian 
cooperation ..... The Danish minister had good reason for 
paying attention to the article. Apart from its cautious but still 
unmistakenly positive attitude to the general idea of Nordic 
cooperation, it was clearly more positive to Fm1and's role than 
what was still the customary Soviet position at the time.'· It 
is also interesting for its, although only implicit, endorsement 
of Scandinavian and Finnish rearmament. In view of later 
developments, it should be noted that there is no explicit 
disapproval of the alleged Swedish discussions about a 
fortification of the AIand Islands. 
Summing up: the changed international situation after the 
emergence of a threatening fasCist Germarry challenged the 
negative attitude to Nordic and small-power cooperation which 
had been an inherent part of Soviet foreign policy since its 
early days. Having been subdued since Litvinov effectively took 
over power in the Commissariat in the late 1920s, Georgii 
Chicherin's "realist" approach to small-power cooperation 
gradually replaced the "bolshevik" tradition in Soviet poliCies 
towards the Scandinavian states and Finland. 
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1937-38: consolidation of Soviet realism 
1937 saw the definitive breakthrough of the new Soviet 
attitude towards Scandinavia and Finland in general and 
Nordic cooperation in particular. During 1937 the central 
Soviet newspapers published a series of articles depicting 
German aggressive designs in Scandinavia. Soviet attention 
was increasingly focused on Northern Europe's strategic 
importance, not least Norway's Atlantic coast line and the 
Baltic straits. The Soviet press also discussed the region's role 
as a supplier of important raw materials and services. For 
instance, articles in Pravda and Krasnaia Zvezda from April 
and August 1937 discussed the strategic importance for 
Germany of Northern Norway in a war between Germany on 
the one hand, and the Soviet Union and Great Britain on the 
other. Apart from this. the April article signa11ed a more 
positive attitude to Nordic cooperation, without directly 
discussing the topic of military cooperation. Germany, accur-
ding to Pravda, was worried by signs of increased cooperation 
between the Nordic countries and between the Oslo states". 
One sign of such cooperation was the Nordic foreign minis-
ters' conference which was to convene in Helsinki one week 
later. The implications of the article were obvious: increased 
Nordic cooperation was contrary to German interests.92 The 
August article concluded that Germany had not succeeded in 
making the Scandinavian states adhere to its "adventurist 
policy" to the degree it desired. The article also argued that 
the Swedish government sought to pursue its foreign and 
security policies independently of German preferences. Sweden, 
accurding to Pravda, was bent on upholding friendship with 
the Soviet Union and the other League of Nations countries." 
Pravda at about the same time chose the unusual procedure of 
paraphrasing the American Foreign Affairs to make an 
identical point The article concluded that Hitler's rise to 
power in Germany had created between that country and the 
Nordic countries "an abyss deeper than the Baltic sea". As a 
result, Germany's influence in Scandinavia was declining." 
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While the central Soviet press and Soviet officials only 
cautiously signalled a new Soviet course, Comintern publi-
cations and some regional or less authoritative Soviet news-
papers and journals were more outspoken. One example will 
illustrate the point. On 8 March 1937 Thorvald Stauning, 
Denmarl<:'s social-democratic prime minister, in a speech in 
Lund rejected the idea of Nordic military cooperation. Stau-
ning specifically rejected the option of Swedish involvement 
in the defence of Denmarl<:'s border with Germany." In one of 
the following issues of Kommunistische lnternationale Stau-
Ding's speech was made the object of a strongly worded 
attack, which left no doubt about Comintern's position. The 
article stated that the idea of Nordic military cooperation was 
broadening its appeal in Scandinavia, and noted that "[zJwei-
feUos neigt die ilffentliche Meinung in den skandinavischen 
Ulndern - und besonders die Albeiterldasse - zu einer posi-
tiven Lilsung der Frage". The author of the article implicitly 
called on the four Nordic foreign ministers to bring up the 
topic under their conference in Helsinki set for the following 
April (the article was obviously written before the meeting)." 
The article further argued that Germany suppotted Stauning's 
position, which conformed to a pattern of Danish subjugation 
to German political pressure and demands. The Scandinavian 
supporters of Nordic military cooperation, on the other hand, 
were led by the conviction "dass man sich gegen den deut-
schen Faschismus zur Wehr selZen kann und soU"." The topic 
should be made the object of discussions in the Nordic 
workers' movement: 
Die skandinavische Arbeiterschoft [ ... J /Ut gut. sich weder von 
dem konservativen Auftreten noch von der Verwirrung. me viele 
sozialdemokratische Parteifilhrer schaffen. i"e/ilhren lassen. 
Vor aI/em soli t.Ue Arbeiterschoft nicht zulassen, dass man die 
Diskussion aber mese lebenswichtige Frage (i.e. Nordic military 
cooperation) totschweigt. Das wird nur dem Faschismus 
zugutekommen." 
The article concluded: 
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Eln so/ehes [I.e. Nordisehes] Verleldigungsbflndnis warde 
erheblich dazu bellragen, Im Rahmen des VOlkerbundes die 
bisherlgen Beslrebungen ZUT Seholfung der kollektiven Sieher-
heil und der Bewahrung des Frledens zu verslllrken." 
Nor was the article in the Kommunlstische InterlUlJlonaJe an 
isolated phenomenon. In January 1937 Rundschau, another 
Comintern publication, had criticized Stauning for opposing 
Danish reannament and "political cooperation between the 
Nordic couotries". Rundschau also criticized the Danish 
premier for not realizing that the four couotries, i.e. also 
Finland, must join forces to defend themselves against the 
nazi threat."n 
Even Pravda, the authoritative mouthpiece of the Soviet 
leadership, gradually became more outspoken. Although the 
newspaper did not explicitly state the Soviet poSition, in 
August 1937 it referred sympathetically to a "rising uoder-
standing" in the Scandinavian countries about the need for 
common defence against Germany.'OI Similar arguments were 
used in an article in October the same year. The threat from 
Germany, it was argued, had fostered an understanding of the 
need for greater unity between the Scandinavian countries. 
They must be prepared to defend their neutrality by military 
means. Denmark was criticized for "actually sabotaging the 
other countries' efforts to strengthen the defence of Scandi-
navia". Although the article did not directly call on the Nordic 
countries to create a defence union, the conclusion could be 
read between the lines.'''' At about the same time Le Journal 
de Moscou, one of the Soviet journals aiming at a foreign 
audience, criticized the Danish "government" press for having 
iilstituted "un ostracisme total" against the idea of transforming 
"I 'entente de Nord" into a military alliance."n 
Die Kommunistische Internationale felt the need to explain the 
changed Soviet position. In the article from June 1937 
discussed above, the signature "Magnus" maintained that 
Germany unto then had no reason to be dissatisfied with 
Scandinavian cooperation. Germany had actively tried to 
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penetrate the Scandinavian countries. The Gennans. however. 
had hardly succeeded: 
So wird es immer weileren Kreissen in Skandinavien klar. von 
welchen Seile man im Nortkn bedroht iSI ulld man wird immer 
Oberzeugler. dass diese Bedrohung nur vom tkutschen F aschis-
mus komml. IO' 
"Fascism" had suffered defeats in all the Nordic countries. In 
Finland the conservative Per Svinhufvud had been replaced as 
president by the agrarian Kyosti Kal1io. and the new govern-
ment of social democrats and agranans of prime minister A.K. 
Cajander had set as its goal the development of the Scandi-
navian connection and the improvement of relations with the 
Soviet Union. Swedish foreign policy had been reoriented 
towards Britain and France. and Swedish officers had hinted 
that they were becoming less preoccupied with the Soviet 
threat. In Norway an influential labour politician had argued 
that Gennany would probably violate Norway's neutrality in 
case of a European war.'" 
Concurrent with the reevaluation of Nordic cooperation. the 
Soviets were moving towards accepting the need for Scandi-
navian rearmament. In one of the articles in Kommunistische 
I nternationale quoted above. the author noted that V lilkisher 
Beobachter had argued that even a "RiesenrUstung" in Den-
mark could not give the country any real security. The 
implication was obviously that left-wingers and social demo-
crats in Denmark. who had traditionally been opposed to 
increased military defence efforts. should reconsider their 
position."" Even if conservatives in Denmark took advantage 
of the situation to push for a "reactionary reannament". this 
fact should not lead the "working class" to oppose greater 
defence efforts out of hand. It was of overriding importance 
to make Denmark able to meet the fascist threat. He rejected 
the traditional attitude among Nordic social democrats that the 
small countries in any case were too weak to set up any 
effective military defence against a great power. The Scandi-
navian communists. who propagated a "democratization" of 
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the military, he argued, nevenheless understood that "eine 
militllrish v/illig ungeschlltzte kleine Nation um so leichter zur 
Beute des faschistischen Rliubers werden kann". '07 
The Pravda article from August 1937 referred to above stated 
clearly that the Soviet Union favoured strong defences in the 
Nordic countries. Scandinavian disarmament, according to 
Pravda, was now being propagated only by a small number of 
"naive pacifists" ,'01 lzvestiia argued that declarations of 
neutrality would not stop the aggressors from realizing their 
plans. The newspaper implied that the small countries must be 
able to defend themselves by military means."" 
Published Soviet diplomatic correspondence sheds more light 
on the evolution of the Soviet attitudes towards Nordic 
cooperation in these years. These documents also reveal that 
the reappraisal partly stemmed from a changed Soviet per-
ception of Nordic foreign and security policies. A letter of 
early May 1937 from deputy commissar of foreign affairs 
Vladimir P. Potemkin to the Soviet ministers in the four 
Nordic capitals demonstrates the Soviet reevaluation of 
Scandinavian and Finnish foreign policies.'1D Potemkin charac-
terized the conference of the four foreign ministers in Helsinki 
on 20-22 April 1937 as one step towards closer cooperation 
between the four countries, although he was aware that no 
substantive measures had been agreed upon. The conference 
also had made it clear that Finland increasingly was becoming 
a member of the "Scandinavian" group. lbis Scandinavian-
Finnish rapprochement had been fundamentally stimulated by 
the improvement in the Finnish-Soviet relationship "which has 
been evident since Holsti's visit to Moscow", and the Scandi-
navians were now less suspicious about Finnish foreign 
policies. 
According to Potemkin, the Helsinki conference had also 
demonstrated, that both the growing support for stronger 
defence efforts and the idea of a "defence union" were 
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generated by the fear of Getman aggression. This development 
was clearly in the interest of the Soviet Union: 
This tendency towards the formation in the North of Europe of 
a regional agreement founded on the principles of collective 
security and objectively directed against the probable aggressor 
(Germany). must be viewed with sympathy on our side. 
However, Denmark's weak policy vis-a-vis Getmany, and "the 
foolish pacifist attitude of the Norwegian government", wOIXed 
against the tendency towards military cooperation. During the 
Helsinki conference, the three other foreign ministers had put 
considerable pressure on Danish foreign minister Peter Munch 
to persuade him to change his attitude, and Potemkin referred 
to rumours that Munch left Helsinki "in a higher spirit". As a 
result of the pressure from his colleagues, Munch had alle-
gedly been forced to soften his negative attitude to Nordic 
defence cooperation. Potemkin also noted with satisfaction that 
the discussions during the Helsinki conference had aroused 
alann in Getmany. 
The Soviet rationale for propagating Scandinavian and Nordic 
cooperation as opposed to the policy of neutrality was further 
explained in a communication from Potemkin to Kollontai, 
Tikhrnenev and Iakubovich in early June 1937.'11 Here, 
Poternkin pointed out two main tendencies in Scandinavian 
foreign policies. On the one hand there was the movement 
towards Nordic cooperation, ultimately aiming at the creation 
of a "Scandinavian-Finnish bloc". This movement was gaining 
in popularity, and it had, Potemkin argued, been reinforced by 
the foreign ministers' conference in Helsinki. Although the 
Scandinavian-Finnish military bloc was still far from reali-
zation, there were Signs that some kind of agreement had been 
reached in Helsinki. On the other hand there was the idea of 
"neutrality", which had as one of its primary aims to weaken 
the Nordic countries' involvement in the League of Nations. 
This tendency, which was directed against collective security, 
was opposed to the idea of a defence union, and was being 
actively supported from Berlin. 
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With the obvious aim of strengthening the first tendency, 
Potemkin instructed the three Soviet ministers to the Scandi-
navian capitals to convey to their host governments the Soviet 
Union's positive attitude to the idea of a Nordic regional 
agreement "within the framework of the League of Nations" .112 
This last qualification was based on Soviet anxiety lest the 
bloc sho~d become a union of neutraIs, working against 
. collective security and propagating revision of the League of 
Nations covenant The Soviet Union wanted a Nordic bloc 
prepared and able to resist Gennan aggression. U3 
Thus, by mid-1937 the Soviets had abandoned their previous 
attitude with regard to Nordic neutrality, cooperation and 
defence policies. From now on Soviet diplomats were assigned 
the task of encouraging Nordic political and military coope-
ration, simultaneously "unmasking" the futility of neutralism 
and "naive pacifISm". Echoing Chicherin's arguments from the 
mid-1920s about Scandinavia as a "buffer" between the Soviet 
Union and the imperialist powers, it was argued that Northern 
countries, if armed and united, could play an important role 
as a barrier ·to German expansionism and aggression. 
, 
The, change in attitude was not conclusive, though. Moscow 
, was still· unable or unwilling to fonnulate and propagate an 
unambiguous policy towards the Scandinavian states: the 
"bolshevik" approach was far from defeated. When Rickard 
Sandler, the Swedish foreign minister, visited Moscow in July 
1937, Litvinov in one of his speeches played down the 
importance of military alliances to counter great power 
aggression, although he mentioned the potential of "pacts of 
mutual assistance" .Il' The experienced Swedish foreign minister 
could hardly inteIprel this otherwise than as a hint that the 
Soviet Union still disliked the idea of Nordic or Scandinavian 
military cooperation. No wonder that it was not generally 
realized inthe Nordic countries that the Soviets had abandoned 
, their previous negative attitude to Nordic political cooperation 
and; militaryreannament 
" 
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Finland: the key to Soviet Nordic policies 
The reevaluation of Soviet policies towards the Northern 
countries reflected the overall reorientation of Soviet foreign 
policies following the rise of the German threat after 1933. 
But regional factors were important as well. 
/ will argue that the new positive Soyiet attitudes to Nordic 
cooperation was related to a simultaneous improvement In the 
Soviet-Finnish relationship. 
Since the early 19308, FInland had gradually strengthened its 
ties with the three Scandlnavian countries. The Scandlnavian 
orientation of Finnish foreign policy was officially confirmed 
when prime minister T.M. Kivim1!ki on 5 December 1935 
declared In Parliament that his government wanted to engage 
In cooperative ventures with the Scandinavian countries "for 
the defence of Nordic neutrality".lI5 Thereafter, "Scandinavian 
orientation" was one of the pillars of Finnish foreign policy. 
Finland's Increasing emphasis on its relations with Scandinavia 
did not bring about an immediate improvement of the coun-
try's relations with the Soviet Union. Paasildvi, for instance, 
felt that the Soviets continued to suspect Finland of, engaging 
in anti-Soviet cooperation with Germany, even of opting for 
an alliance with Germany with offensive designs against the 
Soviet Union."' Nor did the Soviets cease their harsh criti-
cism of Finnish foreign policy. The Finns felt that Zhdanov's 
speech on 29 November 1936, In which he warned the smaller 
states bordering on the Soviet Union not to make their 
territory available for aggressive purposes, was primarily 
directed against Finland."' The standard Soviet argument was 
that the purpose of Finland's orientation towards the Scandi-
navian countries was to influence their foreign policies in an 
anti-Soviet direction.l1U 
It should be noted that the Soviets were not unambiguous in 
their rejection of Finland's Scandinavian orientation. When 
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Finland became a regular participant in the conferences of the 
Nordic foreign ministers from 1934-35, deputy commissar of 
foreign affairs Boris S. Stomoniakov on several occasions 
(August-September 1935; February 1936) expressed satis-
faction with this development in conversations with Scandi-
navian and Fimrlsh politicians and diplomats. '" At the same 
time (February 1936) Stomoniakov told the Swedish minister 
to Moscow, Eric Gyllenstiema, that the Soviet Union, although 
it might welcome Finland's orientation towards the Scandi-
navian countries, was not confident that Finland would proceed 
on this course in the future. Only a government led by the 
Finnish social-democrats would be able to restore Soviet 
confidence in Finland's foreign policy.'20 In her conversations 
with Sandler in early 1936, Kollontai did her best to convince 
the Swedish foreign minister that closer Swedish-FInnish 
cooperation was contrary to the Swedish policy of neutrality. 
This, at least, is what she reponed to Moscow. 121 In turn she 
received instructions from Moscow to continue her efforts to 
reveal the "true nature" of Finland's foreign policies in her 
conversations with the Scandinavians. 
Gustaf Mannerheim, from the Finnish civil war and until his 
death in 1951 a leading personality in Finnish politics, arrived 
at the conclusion that the Soviets did not attach too much 
importance to Finland's Scandinavian orientation as long as 
Sweden remained militarily relatively weak and avoided taking 
upon itself specific obligations with regard to the defence of 
Finland. For the Soviet Union the important thing was whether 
Finland would and could resist an attempt by a third power to 
use Finnish territory as a place d' armes for aggression against 
the Soviet Union. In He got the impression, however, that in 
peacetime Finland's orientation towards the Nordic countries 
was not seen as contrary to Soviet interests.''' 
The official Soviet attitude was to express doubt about the 
sincerity of the reorientation of Finland's foreign policy. The 
Finnish government, according to this line of argument, 
remained basically pro-German and anticSoviet, and used the 
48 
Scandinavian orientation to camouflage their real sympathies.'24 
From the published Soviet diplomatic correspondence it 
appears that the Soviets, even before Kivimllki' s declaration of 
December 5, 1935, distrusted what dley perceived as signs of 
an emerging "Scandinavian orientation" in Finnish foreign 
policy."" 
The disapproving Soviet attitude was also reflected in Soviet 
and Comintern publications. In December 1935 and April 1936 
an article in a major Soviet journal of international affairs 
condemned bodl dle idea of military cooperation or some kind 
of alliance between Fmland and Sweden, and plans aiming at 
a streng1hening of dle Finnish defences. Bodl were seen as 
symptomatic of dle anti-Soviet and pro-Gel1llan Finnish foreign 
policy. Finland, according to the article, played a key role in 
Germany's expansionism in dle Baltic region.'" Somewhat 
later anodler article in dle same journal continued to argue that 
Finland's Nordic orientation was a camouflage for dleir anti-
Soviet policies."" Similar attacks on Finnish foreign and 
defence policies often appeared in dle Soviet press. 
In September 1936 T.M. Kivimllki's conservative government 
resigned after dle parliamentary elections, and dle new 
government of Kyosti Kallio, in which dle agrarlans held dle 
majority, was constituted in dle beginning of October. Soviet 
comments after dle fall of Kivimllki's cabinet were unclear. 
Pravda argued dlat the change of government was an expres-
sion of the growing opposition to dle fOl1ller cabinet's pro-
German foreign policy and right-wing domestic policies. 
Pravda did not, however, expect any great changes in Finnish 
foreign policy.'" It was equally clear, however, that dle 
Soviets welcomed the streng1hened parliamentary position of 
the left and center to the detriment of the conservatives.'" 
Minister of foreign affairs in Kallio's cabinet was Rudolf 
Holsti, who continued in this position in A.K. Cajander's left-
center cabinet after Kallio was elected president in early 1937. 
Holsti, who was known for his critical attitude towards Hitler's 
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GelUlany, set as his primary aim to secure FInland's relations 
with the western great powelS. He continued, however, to 
develop further the Scandinavian orientation, and he also 
wanted to improve FInland's relations with the Soviet Union. 
It is doubtful whether the FInns themselves felt that Holsti's 
foreign policy succeeded in bringing FInnish-Soviet relations 
on a new footing. Paasikivi, for instance, hoped that Holsti's 
appointment as foreign minister would lead to an improvement 
in the relationship with the Soviet Union. Looking back in the 
summer of 1939, he concluded that these hopes had not been 
fulfilled. 13• Max Jakobson, on the other hand, has argued that 
Holsti succeeded even "too well" in efforts to achieve a 
reconciliation with the Kremlin. Holsti, according to Jakobson, 
"had created in Moscow the impression that Finland was 
prepared to entrust her security to the Soviet Union".l3l 
In his reports to Moscow after Holsti became foreign minister, 
Asmus, the Soviet minister in Helsinki, made it clear that 
Holsti wanted to improve relations between FInland and the 
Soviet Union. Litvinov told Holsti in London in May 1937 
that the policies of the new government, including the 
orientation towards the other Nordic countries in Finnish 
foreign policies, showed that FInland endeavoured to remain 
a "democratic" and peace-loving country. At the same time, 
though, Litvinov expressed continued distrust in Finnish 
foreign policy.'" 
As part of his efforts to improve Finland's relations with the 
Soviet Union, Holsti made an official visit to Moscow in 
February 1937. Historians differ as to the results of the visit. 
Paasikivi held the opinion that the visit did not lead to any 
improvement in the relations with the Soviet Union.133 W.M. 
Carlgren maintains a similar opinion, arguing that Finnish-
Soviet relations actually worsened during 1937. Holsti's and 
thereafter Sandler's visits to Moscow, according to Carlgren, 
led only to a short-lived improvement in the Soviet-Finnish 
relationship.'" A different view is held by Juhani Paasivirta, 
who argues that Holsti succeeded in allaying some Soviet 
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concerns over Finland's allegedly close ties with Gennany. 
The visit, according to Paasivirta, "generated a degree of 
optimism in both Moscow and Helsinki".'" 
Soviet historians seem to agn:e that the turn to the left in 
Fmnish politics from 1936/37, which in turn led to the red-
green coalition governments, Kallio's election to the presidency 
and the choice of Holsti as foreign minister, indeed led to a 
certain, although short-lived, improvement in Soviet-Finnish 
relations!'" 
The sources used for this study seem to confinn Paasivirta' s 
evaluation. Erik Asmus' immediate reaction was that the visit 
had been extremely successful. According to him, Gennan 
plans in the Baltic area had been seriously crossed, and Holsti 
had secured his position in the government. Asmus reported 
enthusiastically about a completely changed "atmosphere" in 
Helsinki, whereas Gennany was loosing influence. He con-
cluded that "the Soviet Union has gained much in relation to 
Finland".137 Some months later, however, Asmus reported about 
increased Gennan activity in Finland. But Litvinov's comments 
in May 1937 indicate that the visit, together with the general 
foreign policy of the Cajander government and the election to 
the presidency of Kyosti Kallio, had in fact succeeded in 
improving the troubled relationship between Finland and the 
Soviet Union. Rickard Sandler, the Swedish foreign minister, 
maintained in January 1940 that he had observed an improve-
ment of the Soviet-Finnish relationship "a couple of years 
ago". The Soviet Union, according to Sandler, had become 
convinced about the sincerity of Finland's will to neutrality.'" 
Max Jakobson has pointed to the Iartsev negotiations of 1938 
as a sign that the Soviet attitude towards Finland had changed 
fundamentally as a result primarily of the accession to power 
of a new government and president in Finland. From regarding 
Finland as little more than a Gennan satellite, the Soviet 
proposals showed that Finland was now regarded even as a 
potential ally of the Soviet Union. '" 
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The more optimistic or positive Soviet appraisal of Finnish 
policies was also reflected in the Soviet press. In August 1937 
Pravda concluded that internal political developments in 
Finland, reflected in the demise of the Kivimliki government 
in September 1936 and in the election to the presidency of 
Kyosti Kallio in February 1937, had weakened Gennany's 
position in the country. 
The positive Soviet attitude to Nordic cooperation which 
emerged in 1937 was related to a more open-minded Soviet 
evaluation of Finnish foreign and security policies and a 
simultaneous improvement in the Soviet-Finnish relations. Thus 
was removed one of the main reason for Soviet opposition to 
the idea: the fear that a united North should be involved in 
Finnish anti -Soviet poliCies. Their new view on Finnish affairs 
allowed the Soviets to support or even propagate schemes of 
Nordic political and military cooperation which should include 
Finland. 
However, the Soviet-Finnish "truce" was an unstable one. The 
Soviets took it for granted that the Gennans together with 
Finnish right-wing circles were doing their best to regain their 
lost terrain.'" The visit to Finland in the summer of 1937 of 
a Gennan naval squadron was harshly criticized in the Soviet 
press. Attacks in the Soviet press on Finnish foreign and 
military policies continued through 1938 and 1939 until the 
outbreak of the Winter War. 
1938: Scandinavian communists propagate Nordic 
military cooperation 
Although there is strong evidence that the Soviets from mid-
1937 supported and even propagated the idea of Nordic 
military cooperation, Soviet signals remained ambiguous. The 
new positive attitude was seldom stated clearly as the official 
view. Moreover, various Soviet mouthpieces differed signifi-
cantly from each other in their evaluation of Nordic and 
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Scandinavian affairs. In addition, the editors of Soviet and 
Comintern newspapers and journals were apparently themselves 
only gradually adjusting to new guidelines. In March 1938, for 
example, an article in the Comintern journal Rundschau quoted 
the leader of the Swedish communist party as saying that 
Swedish communists would be prepared to support a stronger 
military defence only if the "masses" had real guarantees that 
the weapons would not be used against wolkers or in the 
seIVice of Hitler's Gennany. More important than military 
reannament was the need for "an ideological rearmament" .• 4. 
This could hardly have been meant to encourage the propo-
nents of Nordic military cooperation. A month later, however, 
Rundschau reported approvingly, without attaching the usual 
ideological strings, that the Scandinavian communist parties 
had called on the govemments of the four Nordic countries to 
create a Nordic "defence bloc". Left alone the four countries 
were too weak to defend themselves. 
The central, widely distributed and most authoritative Soviet 
press organs in matters of foreign and security policies, 
Pravda, IZIIestiia and Krasnaia ZlIezila, were still more hesitant 
than Comintern publications in making clear the changed 
attitude to Nordic milital)' cooperation. Whereas the central 
press had condemned the idea during the press-campaign in 
the autumn of 1934, since 1936-37 the above-mentioned 
papers had been far less explicit They often refrained from 
expressing their own attitude to the idea.'" When the Soviet 
press launched a campaign against small-state and Nordic 
"neutrality" in the summer of 1938, Nordic defence coope-
ration was hardly mentioned. 
Comintern publications were clearly more outspoken when 
they discussed the topic. In September 1938, at the same time 
as the central Soviet press campaigned against small-state 
neutrality without mentioning Nordic military cooperation as 
an alternative for the four Nordic countries, The Communist 
International expressed strong support for the idea. An article 
by the signature R. Magnus implicitly deplored that the 
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Scandinavian governments had rejected the idea. Rather than 
a "union for peace", they had created a "union of appeasement 
and support for the fascist aggressor". The working class in 
the Nordic countries should support efforts to create "a strong 
defence union against fascist aggression".'" 
The Communist International continued its campaign for 
Nordic defence cooperation. In November 1938 it was 
presented as an alternative to the policy of "absolute neutra-
lity", and as prerequisite for a foreign policy which would 
cross Gennany's aggressive plans,''' 
It is interesting to note that a representative of the Soviet 
regional press, the Georgian newspaper Zaria Vostoka, in 
August 1938 directly called on the Nordic countries to create 
a defence union. Zaria Vostoka deplored that the Nordic social 
democratic governments had rejected this "single appropriate 
way of safeguarding the peace".'" 
However, while the most authoritative Soviet press and Soviet 
diplomats were unable to formulate and signal an un-
ambiguous Soviet position with regard to Nordic political and 
military cooperation, the Scandinavian communist parties took 
on the role as the main propagators of the idea. They 
launched the slogan of a "Nordic military union" in mid-
1937, and continued to propagate the idea until early 1939 -
when the Soviet foreign policy leadership apparently had lost 
interest in it. 
The communists in Scandinavia adjusted their poliCies to the 
changes in the dominant Soviet position. The Scandinavian 
communist parties, which as members of the Comintern were 
hardly in a position to define their policy in matters of 
importance independently of Moscow, had already in mid-
1937 begun to propagate the idea of Nordic defence coope-
ration. Hilding Hagberg, who represented the Swedish Commu-
nist Party, argued in the Swedish parliament in favour of 
Nordic defence union cooperation. He emphasized the four 
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Nordic countries' Importance in war time as suppliers of raw 
materials, and that Nordic neutrality would largely serve 
Gennan interests. A "Nordic defence union" should be created 
to defend "the national independence" of the Nordic countries. 
Their cooperation should obviously include Finland.'" Ny Dog, 
a Swedish communist paper, also criticized Sandler after his 
radio speech on the eve of the foreign ministers' conference 
in April 1938 for rejecting the idea of a Nordic defence 
uniOn.147 
Arbeideren, the Norwegian communist newspaper quoted 
above, continued to mirror the changes in policy. From early 
1937 it gradually abandoned its opPOSition to increased 
Norwegian and Scandinavian defence efforts. Norway needed 
"a strong defence, much more effective than the present, which 
the bourgeois class acquired largely for use against the 
country's working population".'" The Norwegian communists 
supported a package of extraordinary allocations for the 
defence which was presented to the Storting by the govern-
ment in spring 1937. At the same time Arbeideren started a 
campaign for the development of Nordic political, economic 
and military cooperation. Stauning's rejection in March 1937 
of Nordic military cooperation was strongly condemned.'" 
Arbeideren pointed to the existence of an indisputable Gennan 
threat to the Nordic countries, including Finland, which could 
be met only by a united North. Domestic developments in the 
Nordic countries themselves had also served to make the idea 
of cooperation between them attractive. Of foremost signifi-
cance was the evolution of the political situation in Finland, 
where the rise of "radical and democratic forces" had led to 
a rapprochement with the Soviet Union. Similar tendencies 
were present in Sweden as well. Gennany only stood to gain 
by Stauning's rejection of Nordic military cooperation."· 
The Scandlnavian communist parties' campaign for Nordic 
military cooperation culminated in March 1938, when the 
Dartish, Swedish and Norwegian parties met in Stockholm and 
issued a declaration in support of the idea. The Scandinavian 
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governments were urged to initiate the creation of "a Nordic 
defence union for the protection of freedom and democracy".l5l 
Thereafter the issue gradually vanished from the columns of 
the newspaper. However, Arbeideren continued to attack the 
"policy of neutrality" and the small countries' "flight from 
Geneva". 
The policy of the Norwegian Communist Party was approved 
by the Comintem apparatus in Moscow. In April 1937, when 
the secretariat of the Comintem Executive Committee (ECC!) 
discussed the policies of the Norwegian party, NKP's secretary 
Emil Lflvlien declared that the struggle for "[d]ie Parole eines 
nordischen Verteidigungsbiindnisses" should be one of the 
Party's priority tasks. The draft resolution set up by the 
Norwegian delegation made the same point, attacking Den-
mark's prime minister Stauning for his rejection of Scandi-
navian military cooperation. The Norwegian communists' 
attitude to the national defence efforts was less clear-cut The 
draft resolution supported increased allocations to the armed 
forces on the precondition that the government supported the 
. creation of a Scandinavian military alliance and undettook 
measures to "democratize" the armed forces.'" The final 
resolution, approved by the ECC! secretariat, set up the 
following guidelines for NKP's foreign policy propaganda: 
ZUsammenarbeit mit den an der Erhaltung des Friedens 
interess/erten Machten im VlJlkerbund. Orientierung aut einen 
Verteidigungsbund der nordischen Staaten gegenJaschistischen 
Aggression. Ausbou der freundsc!uiftlichen Beziehungen zur 
Sowjetunion.'" 
The NKP politburo discussed the matter after the delegation 
returned from Moscow. Referring to his talks in Moscow, 
Lflvlien made it clear that NKP should "energetically" launch 
a campaign Jor the creation of a "Scandinavian defence union 
against the German fascism". It is interesting to note that 
Lflvlien, newly arrived from consultations in Moscow, was 
thoroughly misinformed about the attitudes of Nordic govern-
ment circles to Nordic defence cooperation. The matter, 
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according to L0vlien, had recently been discussed during the 
Nordic foreign ministers' meeting in Helsinki. L0vlien told 
his followers that during the meeting in Helsinki the Nor-
wegian and Swedish foreign ministers had supported the idea, 
whereas the Finnish and the Danish argued against."· 
The discussion in the NKP politburo also revealed the 
continuing difficulty of reaching and unambiguous stand on 
the matter of national defence. This was a "difficult question", 
according to L0vlien, and the Party could not "take responsi-
bility for the defence budget" until there were guarantees that 
the soldiers would not be used against workers.!" 
The Norwegian communists continued to give support to the 
idea of a Scandinavian or Nordic military alliance. As late as 
February 1939 the NKP Central Committee accused the 
Norwegian government of conducting policies which obstructed 
der SChaffung eines Bundes der Staaten des Nordens ZUT 
Verteidigung gegen die P/iJne Hitlerdeutschlands iJber einen 
gewaltsamen AIlgriff aut unsere Viilker [ ... J. 
Norway's independence could be secured only through 
einen Verteidigungsbund mit den anderen lIOrdischen Staaten 
[ ... J. mit denen es aut Grund gemeinsamer politischer und 
IJkollOmischer Interessen und historisch, geograjisch und 
kulturell nahe verbundet ist [ ... J.''' 
By then. in early 1939, the Soviet foreign policy leadership 
had apparently lost most of its interest in the idea of Nordic 
military cooperation. Towards the end of 1938 the issue 
appears to have played a less prominent role in Soviet policy 
towards the Scandinavian countries and Finland. The Soviets 
may have realized that closer forms of Nordic defence 
cooperation would not materialize: the Scandinavian govern-
ments had made it clear that extensive military cooperation 
was not on the political agenda.!" Soviet support for Nordic 
defence cooperation, moreover, conlicted with the ensuing 
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Soviet rapprochement with Gennany. The published Soviet 
diplomatic correspondence for the year 1938 hardly mentions 
the topic. whereas documents from 1937 contained numerous 
allusions to the idea ... • The same holds true for the Soviet 
press from the autumn of 1938. while Comintern publications 
continued their propagation of the idea until the close of the 
year. 
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The end qf the Nordic alternative: Soviet 
attitudes to Nordic cooperation during and 
after the Second World War 
The Soviet rapprochement with Germany which culminated 
with the Soviet-German agreements of August and September 
1939 undercut Litvinov's policy of "collective security" and 
"popular fronts". The new situation also led to a radical 
change in the Soviet policy towards the Northern countries. 
Attempts at Nordic or Scandinavian cooperation were once 
more attacked and ridiculed as "reactionary" and "anti-
Soviet". Soviet attitudes to Nordic cooperation remained 
consistently negative through and after the war, despite the 
rapidly changing international environment. During the war, 
the Soviet-Finnish collflict ruled out Soviet support for Nordic 
or even Scandinavian cooperation. After the war the Soviets 
returned to their pre-1935 approach, refusing to consider the 
possibility that a Nordic entity could acquire real indepen-
dence of the capitalist great powers. Only in the 1950s did 
the pre-war ambivalence reappear. 
The Soviet-Gennan rapprochement, symbolized by the replace-
ment on May 3, 1939, of Litvinov as commissar for foreign 
affairs by Viacheslav Molotov, the outhreak of the World War, 
and the Soviet-Finnish conflict, effectively removed the 
rationale for Soviet support for Nordic political and military 
cooperation. When the idea of some sort of Swedish-Finnish-
Norwegian defensive alliance was discussed in March 1940, 
the Soviets made it absolutely clear that they could not accept 
the creation of such an alliance. The reason was stated 
outright: to Soviet eyes Nordic cooperation was nothing but a 
vehicle for FInnish revanchist designs. More generally, the 
Soviets returned to the propaganda of the 1920s and presented 
Great Britain as the major threat to Soviet security, and 
schemes for Nordic cooperation as elements in Britain's 
aggressive plans. 
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In October 1939 Comintern's Executive Committee discussed 
a draft document with guidelines for the activity of the 
Scandinavian communist parties. The document meant, in fact, 
a complete rejection of almost everything which had until 
recently formed the basis of Soviet Scandinavian policies. 
With regard to Soviet attitudes to Nordic cooperation, it 
epitomized the complete return to the "bolshevik" as opposed 
to the "realpolitik" tradition. Scandinavian communists were 
given the task of unmasking the true nature of the "policy of 
neutrality" of the "Scandinavian governments and capitalists". 
Their policies aimed at bringing these countries into the war, 
and "neutrality" meant effective support of the British and the 
French against - Germany. The document set up the following 
guidelines with regard to the question of Nordic cooperation: 
Konsequenter Kampfgegen die reaktibniire Zusammenorbeit der 
nordischen Staaten, die nur eine Blockbildung unter Fuhrung 
des englischen lmperialismus gegen den wachsenden Einfluss 
der Sowjetunion darstellt und sich gegenwiirtig darauj richtet, 
die lnteressen der Stiirkung der Sicherheit der Sowjetunibn zu 
beschlidigen. 
Comintern attacked the allegedly "feverish rearmament" of the 
Scandinavian governments, and strongly condemned the 
communists for having supported the idea of "national 
defence" in the preceding years.'''' It should be noted, however, 
that the text contained an "escape clause" which linked 
Comintern's position explicitly to the current political situation, 
i.e. preparing the ground for other guidelines if the situation 
changed: 
Man muss erkliiren. das die Losung der "Vaterlandsver-
teidigung" unter den jetzigen Verhii/tnissen (my emphasis, SGH) 
in den skand. Liindern und in Finn/and eine nationalistische 
Losung ist, die von der Bourgeoisie in erster Reihe gegen die 
Sowjetunion gerichtet ist.'60 
One cannot say what would have been the Soviet attitude to 
a neutral bloc comprising only Norway and Sweden if both 
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these countries had been allowed to remain neutral. This was 
not brought up as a serious alternative before the GelIDan 
attack on Norway and Derumuk put an end to the "pre_war" 
debate on Nordic political and military cooperation. However, 
Molotov told the Norwegian and Swedish ministers in Moscow 
that a defence union between these two countries, i.e. without 
Finnish participation, would mean the end to Norwegian and 
Swedish neutrality, and that the Soviet Union would have to 
adjust its policies towards them accordingly.'" 
An internal Narkomindel document from mid-April 1940, 
summing up the recent discussions in Finland, Sweden and 
Norway about a defence union between these three countries, 
COnfilIDS that the "bolshevik idiosyncratic" approach had 
gained the upper hand once more. The document, in fact, 
repeated for internal use the basic elements of the Soviet 
propaganda campaign against the defence union plans. The 
whole idea was presented as a Finnish plot to draw Sweden 
and Norway into war with the USSR, while the British used 
the plan as a vehicle for engaging the Scandinavians on the 
allied side in the European war. Although the GelIDan invasion 
of Norway and Denmark for the time being had brought an 
end to the discussions about Nordic military cooperation, the 
idea could reappear in the future, "in particular if Britain's 
inlluence in these countries is strengthened". It is strongly 
implied in the document that the consequences for the Soviet 
Union of any Scandinavian or Nordic combination would be 
entirely negative.'" A repon from the Soviet minister in 
Norway, written in early April 1940, could only reinforce the 
negative attitude towards Nordic cooperation. Discussing 
Norwegian reactions to the Finnish proposal, Plotnikov 
concluded: "It is clear, that, under the pretext of developing 
the economic cooperation, preparations for a revanchist 
Scandinavian military bloc is already underway" .'63 
Soviet resistance to the idea of post-war Nordic or Scandi-
navian political and military cooperation continued after the 
Soviet Union became a belligerent on the allied side after the 
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Gennan attack on 22 June 1941. In the summer of 1943, Otto 
V. Kuusinen, a prominent Finnish-Soviet politician who spoke 
authoritatively on Scandinavian affairs, used speeches by 
Winston Churchill and Per Edvin Sk61d, the Swedish minister 
of defence, as a pretext to warn against a Nordic bloc as 
harbouring anti-Soviet tendencies.'" The Soviet resistance to 
Nordic cooperation during the war fits well with the Soviet 
Union's general objection to all plans for small-state confede-
rations in Europe. The Soviet point of view, therefore, was 
well known to the Scandinavian foreign policy establishments, 
although the topic hardly played any significant role in Soviet-
Scandinavian relations during the war. '05 
Soviet opposition to Nordic cooperation continued and even 
intensified after the conclusion of the war.'" The Soviets did 
not only attack military or political cooperation: "Every step 
towards Nordic cooperation, even the social services, was 
explicitly branded as a step towards a Swedish-led Nordic 
union directed against the East". "" An article in Pravda on 25 
July 1945 "demasked" the anti-Soviet content of Nordic 
cooperation. From the autumn of 1946, and more energetically 
from the spring of 1947, the Soviets launched a campaign 
against Scandinavian political and military cooperation. 
Scandinavian schemes were depicted as inspired by the 
western great powers in order to subordinate a united North to 
the western military bloc. 
Sweden played a key role in the Soviet campaign against 
Nordic cooperation. Soviet propaganda during and immediately 
after the war contended that Scandinavian cooperation would 
increase Sweden's influence, and Sweden was allegedly more 
"anti-Soviet" than Norway and Denmarlc. The Soviet ambas-
sador to Norway, in his general report for the year 1945, 
pointed to the existence of a continuous Swedish pressure, 
with British support, for the creation of some kind of anti-
Soviet, SwediSh-dominated, "Scandinavian union" .'01 
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It appears, therefore, that the Soviet appreciated the policy of 
"bridge-building" which was declared by the Norwegian and 
Danish governments. This impression is confinned by the 
ambassador's report discussed above. Writing in the summer 
of 1946, N. Kuznetsov, the Soviet ambassador to Oslo, argued 
that the Norwegian government for the time being had "finnly 
decided not to join any political or military bloc which is 
directed against any of the great powers""'" 
With the rise of the Cold War, however, roles changed and so 
did Soviet evaluations of SWeden's role in Scandinavia. Now 
the idea of Nordic cooperation was interpreted as an attempt 
to include "neutral" Sweden in the evolving, real or imagined, 
western military alliances. The bottom line of the Soviet 
attitude was the conviction that any Scandinavian scheme, 
however fonnally independent and "neutral", would become 
effectively integrated into Western structures like the Western 
Union, the emerging Atlantic Pact, or directly linked to 
American and British strategic interests. Although the Soviets 
were aware of the different attitudes towards the Western 
powers in Sweden on the one hand and in Norway and 
Denmarlt on the other, they took it for granted that a Scandi-
navian bloc of any kind would mean the end to Swedish 
neutrality and the integration of the whole of Scandinavia into 
western security systems. 
The Soviet condemnation of Scandinavian cooperation, 
therefore, was not directed towards the idea of a "neutral" 
Scandinavian entity, because nothing like this, according to 
the Soviets, could ever exist. In short, Scandinavian coope-
ration, in whatever disguise, meant western great power 
influence extended to all of Scandinavia. 
Consequently, during the negotiations about defence collabo-
ration between Sweden, Denmarlt and Norway in 194849, 
Moscow strongly condemned the idea of a Scandinavian 
defence union, although the alternative for Norway and 
Denmarlt was to join the emerging Atlantic Pact. The Soviet 
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position with regard to Norway and Nordic cooperation was 
stated in an internal MID memorandum from early January 
1949. Sergei A. Afanasiev, the ambassador to Norway from 
1947 to 1954, and Aleksandr N. Abramov, the head of the 
Fifth European Department in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
wrote in a memorandum to Molotov that the creation of the 
"Nordic defence committee" - probably they had in mind the 
inter-Scandinavian committee which in October 1948 was 
assigned the task of studying the possibility of a Scandinavian 
defence union - meant that the Scandinavians prepared to 
establish "the northern flank" of the "united anti-Soviet front 
of the international reaction" ."0 
This basic Soviet attitude did not change after April 1949: 
from the Soviet perspective, Norway's and Demnark's mem-
bership in the Atlantic alliance was only one more proof that 
they had been puppets of the western great powers even 
before they fonnally entered the western alliance. In the 
following years the Soviets were acutely sensitive about 
anything that might be interpreted as signs of Swedish military 
cooperation with its Scandinavian neighbours and the western 
bloc. m 
When the movement for closer political and economic 
cooperation between the Northern countries gained momentum 
in the early 1950s, the dominant Soviet attitude was equally 
negative. In the 1920s the Soviets had feared Britain's 
influence in Scandinavia. In the first half of the 1930s they 
had seen Gennan intrigues behind all attempts to forge Nordic 
or Scandinavian cooperation. In the early and mid-1950s, their 
general argument was that the urge for Nordic cooperation 
primarily seIVed US interests, even if military collaboration 
was not part of Nordic cooperation after Norway and DemnaiX 
became members of the Atlantic Pact. Nordic collaboration, it 
was argued, seIVed as camouflage for attempts to increase the 
United States' influence in Scandinavia. Despite the non-
military nature of Nordic cooperation, the Soviets apparently 
were convinced about its secret military objectives. Nordic 
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cooperation, it was argued, would in effect Involve Sweden 
and possibly Finland in NATO's military preparations!'72 
Like In the 1920s and 19308, however, there was still room 
for ambiguity and conflicting signals. In 1951-52 there were 
numerous signs that the Soviets were reevaluating their attitude 
to Scandinavian and Nordic cooperation. Soviet diplomats, in 
conversations with their Scandinavian counterparts, showed 
renewed interest in the idea. The Soviet ambassador to 
Stockholm arranged meetings between the Norwegian and 
Danish ambassadors and prominent Swedes, and articles in the 
Soviet press discussed the idea without condemning it outright. 
In February 1951 a communist member of the Swedish 
parliament even appealed to his government to once more 
explore the feasibility of a Scandinavian defence union. 
Thus the "two traditions" in Soviet policy towards Scandi-
navian cooperation continued to coexist When asked in 1955 
what kind of Scandinavian neutrality the Soviet Union 
preferred, isolated or in some sort of a union, the Soviet 
ambassador to Stockholm answered: "There are two lines of 
thought" .173 
* .. " 
In the course of 1955 the Soviet attitude to non-military 
Nordic cooperation changed, and in the autumn of that year 
Finland was allowed to become a member of the Nordic 
Council. The Soviets, of course, argued that their attitude had 
not changed, and that the new policy was the result of the 
changing nature of Nordic cooperation and the more "peaceful" 
policies of the Nordic- Council. The Soviets also pointed to 
the effects of the new international situation expressed by the 
"spirit of Geneva". It was another signal of a more relaxed 
Soviet attitude with regard to Northern Europe that the 
Russians at the same time gave back the Porldcala naval base 
area to Finland. The Soviet refusal to admit that their own 
analysis or basic attitudes had changed echoed the situation of 
the 19308. In the latter half of the 19308 the Soviet Union had 
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been equally reluctant about making explicit the evolution 
towards a positive reappraisal of Nordic military cooperation. 
The Soviet signals after the reevaluation of 1936-37 was so 
vague that few people were aware that the Soviet attitude had 
changed. Also in the early and mid-1950s signs of changing 
Soviet attitudes towards Scandinavian military cooperation 
were ambiguous. The Scandinavians still felt the dominant 
trend was overwhelmingly negative. 
Isolated signs of a more flexible attitude continued to appear 
throughout the 1950s and 19608. For example, in 1958 a 
Soviet diplomat. in Oslo showed interest in the possibility of 
a Swedish-Norwegian-Danish defence union, even if Norway 
and Denmalk remained members of NATO. In October 1966 
Izvestiia printed a rather positive evaluation of the idea of a 
Scandinavian defence union, which was said to be supported 
by "progressive forces" in the Scandinavian countries. 
However, since Norway and Denmark had joined the Atlantic 
Pact and later with the establishment of NATO's integrated 
military structure, the spectre of a Nordic defence community 
vanished from the world of feasible alternatives into a distant 
future of unknown realities. If the idea on some occasions was 
reflected in Soviet foreign policy propaganda and initiatives, 
this did not mean that the Soviets reckoned with its realization 
. in the sholt run. Although the· idea had its adherents who 
managed to keep it alive in SCandinavian foreign policy 
debates, from the Soviet point of view it was useful only as 
a vehicle for the realization of other, an more realistic, foreign 
policy aims. The ambivalence of the Soviet position in the 
1950s most likely stemmed directly from a contradiction 
following from this "secondary" use of the idea of Nordic 
political and military cooperation. On the one hand, it was a 
primary. Soviet foreign policy aim in Scandinavia to keep 
Sweden from engaging in military cooperation with the two 
NATO-countries Norway and Denmalk. This logically led the 
Soviets to oppose all tendencies to closer Scandinavian 
cooperation. On the other hand, underlying Soviet policies 
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towards Norway and Denmark was the long-tenn goal of 
loosening and undennining these countries' integration into 
NATO's political and military structures and Western strategic 
defence planning. This induced the Soviets to play the Nordic 
card, trying to set up at least partial alternatives to Norway's 
and Denmark's sole reliance on NATO. 
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Conclusions 
In May 1926 deputy foreign relations commissar Maksim 
Litvinov sent a letter to Aleksandr M. Makar, who had just 
anived in Oslo to take over the position of Soviet po/pred 
after Aleksandra Kollontai. Litvinov' s message, although 
referring specifically only to Soviet-Norwegian relations, 
formulated some of the basic tenets of the Soviet view on the 
role of small states in international relations and Soviet 
policies towards them. Litvinov argued that Norway's limited 
resources, its one-sided economy (dependence on shipping), 
and its nabourship with the stronger and more resourceful 
Sweden had the consequence that 
small Norway l ... ] caMOt play and does not play the role of 
an independent factor in International relations. 
However, international developments might change this 
situation, and in a new great power conflict the small states 
would play en even more important role than they did during 
the First World War. For the Soviet Union, "which sooner or 
later will become the object of a collective attack", relations 
with Norway and other small countries were therefore impor-
tant. The general aim of Soviet policy towards the small 
countries should be 
to support a widening of their independence and to strengthen 
their ability to resist the greedy ambitions of the great 
powers. 174 
Thus was introduced some of the central themes of Soviet 
relations with the Nordic countries and the rest of Europe's 
small states. First, Soviet policies towards the smaller states 
derived directly from the state of Soviet relations with the 
other great powers. Second, small states were not seen as 
actors of their own on the international scene: their actions 
and policies reflected the strategic aims of the capitalist great 
powers. Third, Soviet policies towards the small states should 
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nevenheless endeavour to limit the influence of the great 
powers, and support the small states' striving for real inde-
pendence. 
However, these strategic aims did not automatically generate 
a coherent set of policies. With regard to Soviet attitudes to 
small-state political and military cooperation, one set of 
contradictions was inherent in these general aims themselves. 
On the one hand, the tendency to disregard small states' 
potential for independent foreign policy activity bred the 
conviction that all attempts at small-state cooperation, however 
formally independent or non-aligned, were elements in the 
strategic planning of the great powers and therefore anti-
Soviet On the other hand, efforis to encourage small powers' 
independence, however limited ot only potential it might be, 
logically led to a positive evaluation of such attempts: mainly 
through cooperation could the small powers enhance their 
stand vis-a-vis the great powers. As the present study demon-
strates, the Soviets were never able to find an answer to this 
basic dilemma. 
This inherent contradiction of Soviet policies was reinforced 
by the existence within the Soviet foreign policy establishment 
of two set of basic approaches: one basically of a "realpolitik" 
inclination, the other heavily influenced by the idiosyncracies 
of the bolshevik world view. 
The predominant, negative, attitude towards regional coope-
ration between the Soviet Union's small'state neighbours 
derived from the anti-capitalism of leninism . iiself and the 
bolshevik experience of being alone in a hostile world, 
surrounded by capitalist states that would use any opportunity 
to harm or ultimately attack the Soviet state. This scheme left 
little room for differentiation between capitalist states, big or 
small, and conflicts between them were seen as secondary 
compared to their basic hostility towards the Soviet Union. 
Cooperative ventures that would give additional strength to a 
group of capitalist states were therefore seen as potentially 
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dangerous to the Soviet Union. They would sooner or later 
reveal their anti-Soviet rationale. This interpretation of the 
world left no room for Soviet support for Scandinavian or 
Nordic cooperation, which was consistently seen as part of a 
larger scheme inspired by the hostile western great powers to 
create an anti-Soviet bloc in Northern Europe and the Baltic 
area. 
The alternative tradition, which for long periods was subdued 
and which dominated Soviet policies towards the Northern 
countries only in parts of the late 1930s, looked at Scandi-
navian and Nordic cooperation on the basis of an analysis of 
its potential role in European great-power politics. This 
tradition was based on a more optimistic view of the smaller 
states' ability and will to act independently on the international 
scene. It also was more prepared than the dominant trend to 
accept the existence of fundamental differences of interest 
between capitalist states. Thinking based on this alternative 
view did not take it for granted that schemes of small-state 
cooperation would automatically come under the influence of 
the western great powers. It tended, not surprisingly, to take 
a positive stand towards schemes of Nordic or Scandinavian 
cooperation. 
From the early 1920s, therefore, Soviet attitodes towards 
Nordic or Scandinavian cooperation evolved along two partly 
conflicting lines, the predominant negative, and the alternative 
positive. In the course of the interwar period the two tenden-
cies at times coexisted and contributed to confusion within the 
foreign policy apparatuses of the Scandinavian countries. Only 
for a short period in the late 1930s did the "realist" approach 
clearly dominate Soviet policy. During the Second World War 
and in the following period of cold war, the "bolshevik" 
approach gained the upper hand, although the pre-war ambi-
guity reappeared in the 1950s. A study of the 1960s and the 
1970s would presumably show that the "realist" approach was 
strongly present in Soviet policy towards the Nordic countries 
in this period. 
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The evolution of the political situation in Europe and regional 
developments in the Northern countries provided the impetus 
for Soviet evaluations and reevaluations of Nordic coope-
ration. The present study suggests that these two sets of 
factors at various times activated one or the other of the two 
traditions or approaches which existed within the Soviet 
foreign policy apparatus. 
The ambiguity became evident in the mid-1920s, when the 
Soviet commissar for foreign affairs, Georgii V. Chicherin, 
argued that the Scandinavian states must combine their limited 
resources and fonn a defence union to deter primarily British 
aggression. Central to Chicherin's point of view was his 
argument that a united and armed North might serve the 
Soviet Union as a buffer against Western aggression. At the 
same time, however, Soviet propaganda opposed regional 
cooperation in the North and in other regions close to the 
Soviet Union, and it was this negative attitude which predomi-
nated in Soviet propaganda. After Chicherin's demise as leader 
of Soviet diplomacy from the late 1920s, for some years the 
Soviet attitude to all fonns of Nordic or Scandinavian coope-
ration was unequivocally negative. From the mid-1930s the 
Soviet approach gradually changed. From early 1937 through 
1938 there is strong evidence that the Soviets came to believe 
that an armed "bloc" of the four Nordic countries might serve 
as a check on Gennan Influence in that part of Europe, and 
even deter Gennan aggression: the idea of Northern Europe as 
a buffer reappeared. But the Soviet attitude was still ambi-
guous, and not without important qualifications. The Soviet 
press continued to attack Scandinavian and FInnish foreign 
policies, so when from early 1937 the Soviets ceased to attack 
the idea of Nordic cooperation per se this went largely un-
noticed in the four countries. Even when the Soviets on some 
occasions during 1937 and 1938 openly encouraged the 
formation of a Nordic military bloc, politicians in the four 
Northern countries failed to grasp the significance of the new 
Soviet signals. Neither was the new Soviet position reflected 
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in the public opinion in the Scandinavian countries. Right up 
to the outbreak of the Second World War the feeling prevailed 
in the Nordic countries that the Soviet Union had consistently 
opposed all fonns of Nordic cooperation. 
Not surprisingly, the position of the Scandinavian communist 
parties underwent a similar transfonnation. Beginning in mid-
1937, they gradually departed from their traditional stand of 
opposition to defence spending and Nordic defence coope-
ration. In 1938 the Scandinavian communist newspapers and 
joumals opellly propagated the idea of a Nordic defence union 
backed by strengthened military preparations in each of the 
Nordic countries. 
It should be noted, however, that the Soviets probably realized 
that the idea of Nordic defence cooperation or a Nordic 
military union at no point was close to realization. A defence 
union restricted to the Nordic countries, moreover, could not 
alone be relied upon to safeguard Soviet security interests in 
Scandinavia and the Northern Baltic region. Consequently, in 
the tense international situation of the late 19308 the Soviet 
government felt the need to establish its own security system 
in the region. The Iartsev proposals of 1938 obviously 
represented an attempt to establish this kind of alliance 
commitments directly linked to Soviet security interests. In 
Paasivirta's interpretation, the Iartsev proposals, and Soviet 
proposals during the Soviet-Finnish negotiations of 1939, 
reflected Soviet /lopes of "seeing Finland disengaged from the 
Nordic neutrals" and linked to a Soviet-sponsored alliance 
arrangement 17' 
In the second half of the 1930s, therefore, the Soviet Union 
followed a double strategy towards the Northern countries. 
Their primary aim was to achieve reliable security guarantees 
in the Scandinavian and Northern Baltic region. Such security 
guarantees could only be achieved by way of direct bilateral 
defence or alliance arrangements with Finland and the Baltic 
states -- in practical tenns a forerunner of the policy of 
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"decoupling" of the post-war period. The other, probably less 
important, part of Soviet strategy in the region was to 
encourage Nordic defence cooperation and reannament. 
The impression prevalent in the Northern countries that the 
Soviets had been consistently opposed to Nordic political and 
military cooperation was reinforced by deyelopments on the 
eve of and in the beginning of the war. From mid-1938 the 
Soviets gradually lost interest in the idea of a Nordic defence 
community, concentrating instead on effortS to Conclude 
bilateral security arrangements with the countries most directly 
linked to Soviet security interests. In the Scandinavian-Baltic 
region this meant FInland and the three Baltic countries, 
Uthuania, Latvia and Estonia. Soviet policies towards the 
Northern countries became dominated by the dispute over the 
proposed Swedish-Finnish remilitarization of the Aland Islands, 
and by simultaneous Soviet-Finnish negotiations about a 
bilateral security arrangement. A remilitarization of the Nand 
Islands would directly affect Soviet security interests. The 
Soviets, however, were not assigned a role in the joint 
Swedish-FInnish project. At the same time, moreover, Finland 
was unwilling to accept the Soviet demands for territorial 
adjustments and a Soviet-Finnish security agreelllent. Manner-
heim argued in his memoirs that greater Finnish willingness to 
accede to the Soviet demands during 'the negotiagons of 1938 
and 1939 might have led to Soviet acceptance of the Aland-
plan as a first step towards a broader scheme for Nordic 
military cooperation.'" Soviet policies in the latel930s thus 
demonstrated an interesting mixture of cautious suppon for 
regional initiatives on the one hand, and effortS to erect 
bilateral security arrangements on the other. 
After the So.viet government in the spring of 1939 began 
preparing the ground for an agreement with Germany, the idea 
of an independent Nordic defence community no longer suited 
Soviet foreign policy strategy in the region. When the idea 
reappeared in March 1940, it was doomed from the very 
beginning. At that point, after the Winter War, the Soviets 
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could hardly be expected to sanction a Nordic bloc which 
included Finland. 
Soviet resistance to schemes of Nordic political and military 
cooperation continued and even intensified during and after 
the Second World War. During the war and in the first post-
war years Soviet propaganda was mainly directed against 
Sweden, which allegedly harboured more anti-Soviet aspi-
rations than Norway and Sweden.171 With the rise of the cold 
war, the Soviet perspective changed: from now on Nordic 
cooperation was condemned as a vehicle for British, later US, 
hegemony in Scandinavia. In view of this it is hardly sur-
prising that Finland, due to the country's special status vis-
a-vis the Soviet Union after the Second World War, from the 
beginning was not allowed to become a member of the Nordic 
Council, the main forum for Nordic political cooperation, 
although foreign and security policies were not discussed in 
this forum. 
. ... 
It is tempting to ask why Soviet signalling in 1937-38 
evidently failed to convey the new positive Soviet attitude to 
Nordic cooperation. The answer to this question illustrates a 
particular asymmetry in the relationship between great powers 
and small states. This relationship looks fundamentally 
different from the viewpoint of the two sides. On the one 
hand, small states will assign primaIY importance to relations 
with great powers, and matters pertaining to this relationship, 
even the minor ones, will often be discussed and decided on 
the highest political level. The foreign minister himself will be 
deeply involved in the process.'" For great powers, on the 
other hand, relations with small powers are of secondaIY 
importance. Solutions and decisions will be worked out as 
routine matters within and by the foreign policy bureaucracy, 
which will be allowed to play a relatively independent role 
and even to decide matters of primaIY importance to small 
powers. 
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· Small states will instinctively expect great powers to treat the 
relationship as seriously as they do themselves. More specifi-
cally, small states expect that matters of mutual interest, which 
small states make the object of major deliberations on the 
political level, will be similarly dealt with by great powers. 
The effect might be that small states ignore what more often 
than not is the policy of great powers with regard to smaller 
states: the signals and decisions of the bureaucracy and 
signals from the lower political level, waiting in wain for 
clear-cut top-level statements. The ambiguity of Soviet 
signalling was further increased by the strategy of using local 
communist parties to express Soviet foreign policy opinions. 
Rather than to expect the Commissar or minister of foreign 
affairs to herald changes in Soviet perceptions and policies, 
Scandinavian foreign policymakers were well advised to order 
their subordinates to browse Pravda, lzvestlia, the newspapers 
of the local communist parties and the journals of the Comin-
tern or other Soviet-sponsored organizations. 
This asymmetry of expectations, which seems to be a penna-
nent element in great power-small states relationships, added 
to the problems of perceptions which were peculiar to relations 
between the communist USSR and western countries. One 
example will illustrate the point In 1948-49 and in later 
discussions, Scandlnavians have found it hard to understand 
why the Soviet Union so vehemently opposed a Scandinavian 
defence pact, even though Norway's and Denmarlc's alternative 
clearly was to join the emerging Atlantic alliance. Adherents 
of the Scandinavian solution felt that a regional arrangement 
would be less threatening to the Soviet Union. We have seen 
that this was not the case. The two-camp interpretation of the 
world denied the possibility of the existence of a "third force" 
in the fonn of independent regional systems of developed 
capitalist states. Only international developments, in the fonn 
of a break-up of the united front of the capitalist great powers 
as in the 1930s, or a weakening of Soviet-Western tensions as 
it occurred periodically since the mid-1950s, opened the gate 
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for the "alternative" approach to Nomic political and military 
cooperation. 
. ! 
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There would have been no final version of this study without 
the generous help, advise and encouragement I received from 
my colleagues at IFS Tom Kristiansen, Olav Njj1!1stad, Olav 
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77 
7. Cf. Tom M. Hetland, Sovjeturrionen og nors/: tryggingspolilikk 
1948-1959, University of Bergen, 1983; Maty Dau. Danmar/: og 
Sovjetunionen 1944-1949, Copenhagen & ArhllS, 1969. For a 
discussion within an overall and somewhat polemic intel]lretation of 
Danish-Soviet relations, see Bent ]ensen, Tryk og tilpasning, 
Copenhagen, 1987. 
8. Ti!mudd, op.ciL, pp. 252-253. 
9. Recent research by Soviet historians seems to prove the high 
degree of even institutional continuity between the Comintern and 
certain party organs. 
10. Both Chicherin and his successor Litvinov were apparently rather 
unhappy about the activities of the Comintern. Aina Kuusinen, Otto 
Wille Kuusinen's wife at the time, relates how at the time of the 
Zinoviev-letter affair Chicherin came to the Comintern headquarter 
and "held a long conversation with my husband and Pyatuitsky 
behind closed doors". Kuusinen afterwards told her that "Chicherin 
had raged .against the Comintern for geoing itself involved in secret 
activities which would greatly damage the Soviet Union's diplomatic 
relations. He had demanded that the Comintern should cease to 
involve itself in illegal work, and should leave this kind of activity 
10 the appropriate organizations." Aino Kuusinen, Before and After 
Stalin, London 1974, p. 51. Litvinov was of a similar opinion, 
reportedly suggesting 10 the British ambassador 10 Moscow "that 
London take its domestic communists and "hang them or bum them 
alive" if it so desired. The Comintern itself was "hopeless", and 
Litvinov added: "Why don't you take [the Comintern]? You are a 
free country." Quoted from Hugh Phillips, "Glasnost' and the HislOry 
of Soviet Foreign Policy", Problems of Communism, July-August 
1991, p. 65. 
11. Cf. Timothy E. O'Connor, Diplomacy and Revolution. G.V. 
Chicherin and Soviet Foreign Policy, 1918-1930, Iowa State UP, 
1988. 
12. See ]onathan Haslam, Soviet Foreign Policy 1930-33. The Impact 
of the Depression, Birmingham 1983, p. 10 and pp. 18-20 for a 
stimulating discussion of the Soviet foreign policymalting process 
under Lenin and Stalin. Haslam argues that current policies were 
mainly formulated by the NKJD, but that interventions from above 
could create confllSion and result in the implementation of incon-
sistent policies. One can easily agree with HasIam' s conclusion that 
"Soviet foreign policy was far from monolithic". Ibid., p. 20. 
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